Kuala Lumpur, 20 February 1964
231. Secret Immediate
Ceasefire in Borneo
My 227.1
I spoke to Razak briefly this morning before he left for Pahang and later to Ghazali. My immediately following telegram is the text of the letter which Razak gave Head this morning. As you will see it is milder than Razak intended last night. Razak at least hinted that if the British could not take adequate measures he would feel obliged to make the letter public.2
2. Head and the C in C Far East have agreed that something must be done and in particular that an Air Identification Area should be proclaimed within which unauthorised aircraft would be intercepted.3 The proclamation will be made by the Malaysians as soon as it can be made effective. This involves movement of fighters.
3. Malaysians have no knowledge of when the Indonesians might take direct action. The proclamation of the Air Identification Area will in itself be a clear warning to Indonesia.4
4. I drew the attention of Razak and Ghazali to Subandrio’s statement in Djakarta yesterday seeking to put responsibility for any war on Malaysia.5 I suggested that a statement might be made incorporating the following points:
(a) Malaysia had made major concessions in the cause of peace.
(b) As Razak had pointed out in Bangkok a ceasefire could only be effective if Indonesia withdrew her armed forces from Malaysian soil.
(c) Malaysians had been conciliatory and patient over recent weeks so that Indonesia could arrange this withdrawal.
(d) Malaysia had made it clear through ceasefire liaison channels in Bangkok that further aggression such as dropping of supplies to armed Indonesian forces in Malaysia could not be tolerated.
(e)If Indonesian aggression continued the ceasefire could not be effective and responsibility for the consequences would rest squarely with Indonesia.
(f)Subject to the foregoing Malaysians were ready at all times to discuss how the ceasefire could be made effective both through the ceasefire liaison channels at Bangkok and if necessary at a ministerial meeting called for this purpose.
5. Both Razak and Ghazali agreed with this suggestion. They also agreed that the Malaysian position might be circulated in the United Nations New York and that a special mission should be sent as soon as possible to promote their cause in New York and Washington (your telegram 183).6 For political reasons and because of publicity involved there seems no prospect of the Tunku agreeing to Lee Kuan Yew going7 and Razak would probably lead the mission. In view of the forthcoming I doubt if Razak could make the trip before mid-April.
6. Ghazali told me that Ramani will be back in Kuala Lumpur for consultations this week.8 Ghazali has instructed his staff to prepare a submission to an emergency session of the Security Council so that no time will be lost in appealing to the United Nations if an Indonesian plane is shot down in Malaysian territory.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 21]
1 19 February. It advised that the Malaysians had asked the British for protection against violation of their air space, including a request that intruding Indonesian planes should be shot down if necessary.
2 Razak had written in response to Head’s agreement the previous day that a fighter squadron should be sent to Labuan but that ‘action should be restricted to buzzing Indonesian intruders’. This had not satisfied the Malaysians and Razak had declared that he would write to the British ‘making it clear that if [the] British refused [stronger action], Malaysians would be obliged to publicise British failure to honour Defence Agreement and make immediate appeal to Security Council’.
3 That is, an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ)—a zone into which, in accordance with normal international practice, no unauthorised aircraft would be permitted to enter or fly.
4 The air space over Sabah and Sarawak was proclaimed an ADIZ, effective from 0800 hours, 23 February.
5 On 19 February, Antara reported Subandrio as having said that Indonesia was ‘ready at any time and any place to settle [Malaysia] by peaceful talks’ and musing: ‘Do they (Malaysia) want war if they do not wish to have such crucial international questions as the so-called ‘Malaysia’ settled through negotiations?’
6 Document 160.
7 See footnote 8, Document 160.
8 See footnote 4, Document 161.