Canberra, 27 February 1964
170. Secret Immediate
Malaysia
As you know another Ministerial Meeting is now to be held in Bangkok on 3rd March.1 The Malaysians in proposing it said they wanted it confined to the cease-fire and presence of Indonesian troops.
2. We know that the Indonesians and Filipinos would prefer to go straight to a Summit Meeting, and they may go to Bangkok to press for a Summit Meeting as soon as possible. Subandrio at the last Bangkok meeting said he himself was finding it hard to get Sukarno to agree on a more reasonable policy and that it was Sukarno who had to be convinced before any real solution was possible. Also, Sukarno is the only one who can handle the internal opposition. He will probably run the same line this time for American and other ears.
3. The Americans would probably support the holding of a Summit and other Afro-Asian countries may see no harm in it. It would be very difficult for the Malaysians to say they would not have a Summit but that they were going to the Security Council instead.
4. On the other hand, the Malaysian Cabinet would be sensibly split on the Tunku group2 even if he was so minded. It would be regarded as a humiliation for the Prime Minister of Malaysia to attend the Summit while Indonesian forces were still on Malaysian territory and while he is not accepted as the Prime Minister of his country by the other parties at the Meeting. The Malaysians have gone as far as they can consistent with their national dignity. It would also arouse suspicions and tensions among the Chinese and among the leaders of Sabah and Sarawak who doubt the Tunku’s strength and tactical ability.
5. This has led us to wonder whether the Malaysians might offer to have a Summit Meeting provided that it is held at the United Nations Headquarters and under the auspices or using the good offices of the Secretary-General.
6. The Tunku could well say that he refuses to attend the meeting with representatives of countries which are not in diplomatic relations with his own but that he is prepared to meet them, as all three are members of the United Nations, on United Nations territory and through the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Our first preference would be that the meeting should be in New York and thus attract wide American interest but alternatively it could be held in Geneva.
7. The Malaysians could also argue that the issues at stake involve high questions of international principles, which are embodied in the United Nations Charter, and which must be of concern to the organised international community. Efforts at solving the problems on a regional basis in the first instance, as envisaged in the Charter, having failed, the Malaysians now feel that they should turn to a closer association with the United Nations organisation. They are still, however, refraining from laying a complaint with the Security Council, preferring to use the facilities of the United Nations to come to a peaceful settlement with Indonesia.
8. Idea has been put to Minister who considers it has value and wants it explored further. We would like to have your urgent comments on it particularly as to procedure and the likely reaction of U Thant. It may be asking too much for him to chair the meeting but he could open it. The technical advice of the Secretary-General could fairly be sought on the cease-fire arrangements and on the supervisory arrangements to give them effect, adding to the association he has already accepted.
9. We think that such an arrangement would have most of the advantages of formal Security Council consideration of the matter while avoiding the disadvantages. From the Malaysian point of view, there would be further advantages that the meeting could be orderly and disciplined and removed from the atmosphere of vague consensus, musjawarah, and ‘Asian solutions for Asian problems’ obscurities. Records of proceedings would be kept and the international authority would know what transpired.
10. It is, of course, doubtful that Sukarno would agree, but that would be up to him. He would not relish the public exposure that would be involved. As to this, the Malaysians would be better served if they could make a proposal which was acceptable to the Secretary-General so that the onus would be solely and wholely on Indonesia.
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A1838, 3027/9/1 part 2]
1 It had been decided at the meeting in Bangkok, 5–10 February, that the ministers would ‘study further proposals for resolving the main political issues in consultation with their respective Governments’ and meet again at ministerial level prior to a summit meeting (see editorial note, 1964 Tripartite Talks ).
2 Presumably, text has been corrupted in transmission. Possibly, ‘going’.