Bangkok, 3 March 1964
06. Secret Emergency
Critchley, who arrived in Bangkok from Hua Hin1 this morning in transit to Kuala Lumpur, has asked me to send you the following message.
Begins:—
The Tunku has decided to consult with Razak in Bangkok on the Malaysia stand in the Ministerial talks. Although he does not admit it I believe the Thais have succeeded in persuading him (unwisely in my opinion) to stay in Bangkok while the talks are on.
2. In Hua Hin last night (March 2nd) the Tunku told me that the Thais on the instigation of a powerful friend (United States) were urging him to agree to participate in Summit talks and entertain concrete proposals from Indonesia for a settlement (presumably another ascertainment). However, he is strongly opposed to this and feels that it would be both unwise and humiliating in the present circumstances.
3. This morning the Tunku appeared determined to adopt the following attitude:—
‘Malaysia cannot attend a Summit under duress. Instead any meeting must be unconditional, i.e. on terms of equality. At present there is no cease-fire. Indonesian forces are still in Malaysian territory and continuing acts of aggression (before Summit could be held it would be necessary to have an effective cease-fire to provide an adequate climate for a successful meeting. This requires Indonesian forces to be confined in their own territory and is the minimum Malaysia could expect as evidence of Indonesia’s good faith).’
4. Tunku also intends that it should be put plainly to the Philippines that they are not a neutral party:—
(a) They have refused to accept the impartial ascertainment for the U Thant Mission.
(b) They have refused to recognise Malaysia.
(c) They have an axe to grind, namely the claim on Sabah.
5. Tunku’s main concern is whether he can count on the support of Britain and Australia. He suggested I return to Kuala Lumpur via Bangkok so that I could seek your views urgently. He is also sending an urgent message to Head in Kuala Lumpur this morning outlining his intended stand and asking whether he can count on British support.
6. I am leaving for Kuala Lumpur at 10.00 a.m. tomorrow (March 4th) but the Tunku said that with Razak he would find some means of talking with me this evening.
7. In the course of the weekend the Thais (Thanat and Pote Sarasin)2 have admitted that they see no prospect of a settlement with Indonesia. Thanat described the outlook as ‘grim’. They feel, however, that Malaysia must do everything it can to persuade the Western world that it wants a peaceful settlement. I agree that Malaysia should be conciliatory but pointed out that the Tunku could not afford to appear weak or vacillating without risking loss of support in Malaysia in a critical pre-election period and without running the danger of losing some of the sympathy he now enjoys abroad. The Thais agreed to accept these limitations.3
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/9 part 5]
1 A resort town on the Gulf of Thailand, south of Bangkok.
2 Pote Sarasin, Thai Minister for National Development.
3 Barwick responded immediately to this report and, in Bangkok 202, instructed that the Malaysians be informed urgently that he believed that the Tunku’s attitude was correct and that the terms of withdrawal of Indonesian forces were ‘ not negotiable issues for a summit however much the details of arrangement … may appropriately be discussed at lower ministerial level’.