Canberra, 10 March 1964
282. Secret Priority
Malaysian Approach to United Nations
Your 352.1
Our position on reference to the United Nations has not changed. We think that the time for the appeal to the Security Council is not appropriate now for three reasons:
(a) despite the break-down of the Ministerial meeting the Malaysians cannot yet produce evidence of such large-scale incursions as would really convince most United Nations members of the seriousness of the situation;
(b) preparatory work in New York has not got far and unfortunately the Malaysians’ own contribution has not amounted to much;
(c) more important, the United States despite its participation in talks among delegations in New York about reference to the Security Council is opposed to the exercise. You will have seen from telegrams repeated to you how strong the opposition in the State Department is.2 The time might come of course when we might wish to move despite United States reluctance but this would be a serious step.
2. The Malaysians will know about the American position through direct American representations. Since the Malaysians must be feeling considerable frustration with the United States it would probably be as well for them to understand that we have arrived at our own judgment independently and that the American position is only one factor in our consideration.
3. You should continue to urge that the Malaysians send a letter to the President of the Security Council as a matter of urgency. A number of the principles defined in our telegram No. 256 could be worked into the message.3 We are sending you in today’s bag New York Savingram No. 10 which in its second paragraph has a number of relevant comments on the sort of charter language which the Malaysians should use,4 bearing in mind that the letter could become the basis of a later substantive request for a Council Meeting.
4. We have also sent you in today’s bag a copy of the paper on collateral measures prepared by the Mission which, with your minor editing, seems a very useful paper to hand to the Malaysians and discuss with them.5 New York’s telegram No. U.N.277 refers.6 If Lee Kuan Yew is likely to go to New York and Washington shortly you might arrange with Pritchett for these points to be brought to his notice.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/9/1 part 2]
1 9 March. It contained a request from Critchley for DEA’s up-to-date thinking on a possible Malaysian complaint to the Security Council. Prior to the Malaysian Cabinet’s consideration on 9 March of a formal reference of the dispute to the UN, the Tunku had asked Critchley’s views on why Malaysia’s ‘friends’ were opposed to Malaysia’s going to the Security Council. Critchley had advised caution, drawing on the arguments in Document 163, and suggested that a letter to the President of the Council might be preferable at this stage.
2 In an election year, the US Administration was wary of having to speak strongly in support of Malaysia, as this could effect continued aid to Indonesia, and was concerned that action in the Security Council could lead to a special session of the General Assembly—the hope was that the General Assembly would not convene until after the elections in November (see also footnote 1, Document 169).
3 Document 166 (repeated Kuala Lumpur 256).
4 Not published.
5 An edited version of the paper was passed to the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16 March.
5 27 February. This cablegram number should read UN217. It advised that the despatched collateral measures paper, which dealt with the technical aspects of possible Malaysian approaches in the UN, required editing before passing to the Malaysians. In the meantime, the mission’s view was that ‘in present circumstances it would be better to concentrate on short term measures’ that could be taken by Malaysia. They suggested the focus should be on Lee’s, or other senior minister’s, visit to the UN, and on the question of information letters to the President of the Security Council.
5 27 February. This cablegram number should read UN217. It advised that the despatched collateral measures paper, which dealt with the technical aspects of possible Malaysian approaches in the UN, required editing before passing to the Malaysians. In the meantime, the mission’s view was that ‘in present circumstances it would be better to concentrate on short term measures’ that could be taken by Malaysia. They suggested the focus should be on Lee’s, or other senior minister’s, visit to the UN, and on the question of information letters to the President of the Security Council.