Canberra, 14 April 1964
Top Secret
Submission No. 136—Australian Forces for the Defence of Malaysia
The Committee considered in the first place the message received during the week-end from the British Prime Minister seeking the approval of the Australian Government to the use in Borneo of the Australian battalion in the Strategic Reserve, and the use also of Australian S.A.S. troops.1
2. It decided that there should be no immediate response to this request pending further consideration of it—the consideration to include an assessment by an Australian military representative of the need for forces, and a check as to the United States view on the use of Australian forces in Borneo. It was agreed that the Prime Minister would send an interim message to the British Prime Minister, and that the Minister for External Affairs, now in Manila at the SEATO meeting, would be asked to test the reactions of the United States Secretary of State.2
3. Concerning the requests by the Malaysian Ministry of Defence for Australian forces, the Committee reached the following decisions:—
(a) Engineer Unit: An A.R.A. Engineer Squadron to be made available for service in Borneo.
(b) Light Anti-Aircraft Batteries: The despatch of the Regular Army L.A.A. Battery to Malaysia was considered. It was agreed that it should not be made available until the wider aspects of planning to meet overt Indonesian aggression had been examined and the problem viewed as a whole. It was further agreed that against that background the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, should be consulted as to the best disposition of the L.A.A. battery—i.e. either at Darwin or in Malaysia. In case it is considered, following consultations with the Commander-in-Chief, that the battery should be sent to Malaysia, it was suggested that such preliminary steps towards preparing it for despatch which are available to be taken, should be taken.3
(c) Field Ambulance Unit: Unable to be supplied.
(d) Coastal Minesweepers: Two minesweepers to be made available immediately, with an indication that two additional units will be available about mid-year (i.e. after their June commitment to New Guinea), if the requirement for them remains.
(e) Helicopters: Four R.A.A.F. helicopters and four to five pilots to be made available immediately, these to be augmented by two helicopters and pilots within a period of a few months when training arrangements permit—the helicopters to be based at Butterworth for operations on the Thai/Malaya border, and the posting of the pilots to be short term, e.g. six months.
(f) Short Range Transport Aircraft: An offer to be made now to add a Dakota and crew to the two aircraft now at Butterworth.
(g) Troop and Freight Carrying Aircraft: An offer to be made to Malaysia of six C l30 flights per month, tied in with the normal Australia/Butterworth courier run.
(h) Light Reconnaissance/Liaison Aircraft: Unable to be supplied.
4. It was decided that H.M.A.S. Sydney should be used to transport the Army and R.A.A.F. contributions to Malaysia. It was also decided that arrangements should be sought whereby H.M.A.S. Yarra and H.M.A.S. Parramatta would escort ‘Sydney’ over the final sections of the journey to Malaysia.
5. The Committee decided that a message should be sent immediately to the Malaysian Government indicating the nature of the response and inviting Malaysia to make a formal request to Australia for the supply of the items available.4 It is proposed to announce this decision in Parliament on 16th April,5 steps being taken beforehand to inform the British, American and New Zealand Governments.6
[NAA: A4940, C l473]
1 See footnote 5, Document 180.
2 Rusk was also attending the SEATO meeting in Manila, 13–15 April.
3 Cabinet Decision No. 169, 23 April, later approved that an LAA battery should be provided immediately to assist in the defence of the Butterworth airfield.
4 On 15 April, Critchley was instructed to obtain a formal request for assistance from Razak or the Tunku ‘as soon as possible’, which should be limited to what Cabinet had decided Australia could provide. Razak gave Malaysia’s formal request to Critchley that evening.
5 CPD , H. of R. vol. 41, 16 April 1964, pp. 1192–3. In discussing the political aspects of the draft of this statement by the Minister for Defence, the DEA view was that the statement ‘should be factual in tone, free from polemics and set in an unemotional key’. The perceived needs were to demonstrate to the US that Australia was ‘handling this problem quietly and unprovocatively’, and to avoid giving Indonesia any excuse for retaliatory measures, particularly in regard to overflying rights for QANTAS and the RAAF.
6 The cablegram to Critchley of 15 April (footnote 4) was repeated to these posts with this instruction. It was also repeated to Manila so that Holyoake, Rusk and Lord Carrington (UK Minister without Portfolio) could be informed. On 15 April also, Menzies sent a message to Douglas-Home informing him of Australia’s response to the Malaysian requests. In regard to the matter of Australian combat forces for Sabah and Sarawak raised in Douglas-Home’s letter of 10 April, Menzies stressed that this reply was ‘interim—not final’, pointing out that Australia was not avoiding its commitments but wished to make its own intelligence assessment of the situation so as to avoid the potentially provocative action of deploying forces either in excess or ahead of need. In drafting this reply, Bunting told Menzies that he had ‘tried to keep it neutral as between an ultimate yes and an ultimate no’.