Canberra, 17 April 1964
453. Confidential Immediate
Please pass the following message to Dr Subandrio from me.
Begins:
‘Mr Shann tells me that he has already informed you of the statement by the Australian Minister of Defence in Parliament on 16th April announcing that we have agreed to provide further assistance for the defence of Malaysia.
I am sure that this decision will not have surprised you because I have been at pains to make it clear to you that our support for Malaysia was serious and continuing. My purpose in sending you this message is to underline once again that so long as Indonesian attacks on Malaysia are maintained, we shall have no alternative but to continue along this road. In my letter to you of December last, I earnestly asked that before you took or counselled any action which might lead to a further deterioration of the position, you should keep in mind the risk of increased Australian involvement which in turn could scarcely fail to involve others.1 A continuation of your present policy must seriously increase Australian involvement. Must I conclude that the increased scale of Indonesian attacks on Malaysia means that you have weighed these risks and concluded that the destruction of your neighbour is your only interest? If this is so, then the future of the relations between Indonesia and Australia is dark indeed.
On the other hand, if Indonesia hopes to bring about negotiations by military pressure, surely you will realize that to yield to such pressure is not a course which we could honourably urge Malaysia to accept. May I assure you of my continued personal regard and my earnest hope that even at this stage you will see the merits of an honourable settlement and the recognition of Malaysia as an accomplished fact?’2
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/9 part 6]
1 Document 142.
2 Shann was unable to see Subandrio until 24 April. During this ‘cordial but somewhat more outspoken than usual’ interview, Subandrio said that he ‘knew perfectly well which side we were on and he did not mind what in fact we had done’. What was concerning him was that the latest Australian statements ‘appeared to be bent only on threatening Indonesia into surrender’, particularly the strong statement of military support for Malaysia made by Barwick at the opening session of the SEATO Council Meeting in Manila on 13 April. Subandrio also said that Indonesians now questioned whether Australia regarded itself as a direct party to the dispute and felt that Australia could no longer play a useful part in its settlement—‘something that he had always hoped for’.