Canberra, 12 May 1964
Secret
Malaysia-Indonesia-Philippines—Summit Meeting
This submission outlines the background to the current discussions on the possibility of another Heads of Government meeting between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Critchley, in reporting the Malaysians’ present thinking (telegram No. 565, dated 10th May),2 has asked whether we have any comments we want made to the Tengku and Tun Razak.
2. Following the visit of Mr. Robert Kennedy to South-East Asia in January, and the ordering of a cease-fire in Borneo, two meetings at Ministerial level were held in Bangkok in February and March. Malaysia was represented by the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Razak, and Indonesia and the Philippines by their Foreign Ministers, Dr. Subandrio and Mr. S.P. Lopez. The first meeting, from the 5th to the 10th February, agreed on four conditions or principles for a cease-fire agreement but did not reach agreement on a fifth, crucial condition, the withdrawal of the forces under Indonesian command from the Malaysian Borneo States. Dr. Subandrio left the meeting promising to obtain President Sukarno’s agreement to a procedure for withdrawal which had been worked out at the meeting, but the President’s agreement was not given. Instead, Indonesia began to talk publicly about supplying the guerillas and maintaining them in their positions until some agreement had been reached on the political differences between the two Governments; these differences were not spelled out.
3. On the Malaysian initiative the Ministerial talks were resumed on 3rd March, the Malaysians insisting that the discussions be confined to withdrawal of Indonesian forces, which they said was an essential prerequisite to any further discussions. The Indonesians continued to argue that this withdrawal be linked with political discussions, and the Malaysians refused to go on with the talks. Lopez put forward proposals as a basis for further negotiation. They were:
(i) the Foreign Ministers of Malaysia and Indonesia would agree to disengage their forces and confine these forces to their respective territories;
(ii) at the same time the three Ministers would agree to begin talks with a view to reaching a formal political settlement of their differences;
(iii) they would agree to recommend that a summit conference of their respective Heads of Government be convened.
4. During March and early April these proposals were discussed at length in the three capitals, with the Americans working hard for their acceptance. The three points were expressed in only general terms and their relationship to each other in terms of time was left unclear, so that even with good will on all sides it was not easy to determine just what was involved. The Malaysians agreed to accept the proposals, provided that Indonesia would withdraw the bulk of its forces from Malaysian territory before the commencement of talks at Ministerial level. Agreement to recommend the holding of a summit meeting would be contingent on the complete withdrawal of Indonesian forces.
5. The Indonesian position was that the actual withdrawal of troops would begin at the same time as the political discussions began, and that the timing of the withdrawals would be contingent on progress made in the political discussions.
6. Because the difference between the Malaysian and Indonesian positions was so great the Filipinos began to think again of the possibility of a summit meeting, without any of the preparatory agreement and meetings proposed by Lopez. They began to talk of a summit meeting as soon as the Malayan elections were over.
7. On 2nd May the Philippines sent a message to Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur (through Bangkok), suggesting that an early meeting be held at Ambassadorial level to discuss the time and place of a summit meeting. Djakarta replied, agreeing to an early resumption of talks and undertaking to make a ‘token withdrawal’ of guerillas with their commencement. The Philippines asked whether this withdrawal would be made simultaneously with the commencement of Ambassadorial talks or of the summit meeting. They themselves considered it would be preferable for the withdrawal to begin with the Ambassadorial talks. We do not know whether Djakarta has replied on this point, but the British Foreign Secretary, in a telegram to London on 7th May, said that the Philippines were convinced that they had a clear assurance that the Indonesians were ready to carry out ‘a schedule of withdrawals’ at the start of the talks. The Filipinos told Mr. Butler on 6th May that they had had no reply from the Malaysians.3
8. The Malaysians told our High commission on 8th May that they had received a message from the Filipinos the previous day (7th), proposing an early summit meeting in accordance with the following arrangements:
(a) the three Heads of government would be accompanied by their Foreign Ministers, who would meet immediately beforehand to get ‘the feel of the issue’;
(b) withdrawal of Indonesian troops from Malaysian territory to begin simultaneously with the opening of the summit meeting.
9. The British Foreign Secretary sent a message to the Tunku on 7th, mentioning the new Philippine initiative, saying he was impressed by Macapagal’s sincere approach to the problem as his ‘last try’ with Soekarno and concluding – ‘I hope that you will study Macapagal’s ideas and trust if they preserve the independence and integrity of Malaysia you will feel able to respond generously and flexibly to this genuine attempt to find a way out of the present impasse’.
10. There has been some disagreement among Malaysian Ministers and the Ministry of External Affairs over the reply to be sent to the Philippines. The Tunku’s first reaction was agreeable, provided that the principle of withdrawal was accepted before the talks began and that actual withdrawal would start simultaneously with the opening of the summit meeting. He thought also that Indonesia should agree not to build up its forces on the Malaysian border and that independent observers (Thais) should supervise this undertaking as well as the undertaking that Indonesian-controlled forces be withdrawn from Malaysia.
11. The Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister for Internal Security and the Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs4 have expressed concern at the Tunku’s attitude, and argued that he should not depart from the previous policy of not agreeing to a summit meeting until the Indonesian forces have been substantially withdrawn. Because of this disagreement the Tunku has not sent the reply which he had prepared. He told his Ministers that he knows there is no prospect of any settlement or peace with Sukarno, and his present purpose in showing some flexibility is to assist in building up the Malaysian case for reference to the Security Council. He has also been influenced by Butler’s request. The Malaysians are holding their reply until they hear something more definite about the possible visit of Lopez. Lopez was appointed Permanent Representative to the United Nations on 7th May, and given a ‘special assignment’ for making preparations for a summit meeting. He has said publicly that he is leaving shortly for a two-week visit to Djakarta and that he may then visit Kuala Lumpur to follow up summit negotiations.
12. The following are some comments on the situation: First, there is no sign of any real change in the Indonesian attitude. They have maintained their operations in Borneo and, if anything, increased their capacity for them. They have publicly taken a position of increased opposition to Malaysia, with enrolment of the ‘21 million’ volunteers, and announcements that a brigade of volunteers is to go to Borneo. Since the break-off of the talks in Bangkok they have placed various interpretations on the Lopez proposals, always with the idea of getting around the Malaysian insistence that the Indonesian forces be taken out of Malaysian territory before the talks on a political settlement begin. There is nothing to suggest they are more reconciled to the idea of Malaysia than they were last September.
13. The present Malaysian position is simple and readily understood, both at home and internationally. It is that the Indonesian forces on Malaysian territory must be reduced substantially before negotiations begin on the ‘political differences’. If the Malaysians move away from this position they may find it hard later to take a stand on such good ground. At both Bangkok meetings, and ever since, the Indonesians have been trying to get the Malaysians to adopt a more ‘flexible’ attitude and get them into a position where they might make some political concessions in return for guarantees of an end to border incursions. This is a strong argument against the latest Philippine proposals which are vague on the crucial point of how and when the Indonesian forces are to be withdrawn.
14. The continuing use of the word ‘withdrawal’ of forces is slightly misleading. The forces which were in the Borneo States at the time of the cease-fire have long since been withdrawn, but they have been replaced by other units. The Indonesian forces on the border and on the Malaysian side of the border are in a constant state of movement. Some stay in Malaysia for only a few days and then return to base for rest and re-equipment. The number of guerillas in the Borneo States has fluctuated between two and five hundred in recent weeks. It is now less a question of withdrawing forces than of ceasing to mount new raids and probing operations.
15. The obvious lack of good faith on the Indonesian side, the present situation in Borneo, and the strength of the Malaysian political position are powerful arguments against the Malaysians responding favourably to the latest Philippine proposals. There are, however, arguments in favour of their doing so. Firstly, the Malaysians are engaged in a protracted conflict with the Indonesians, one which is fought in several fields: military, economic, political and ideological. In the political field they cannot just stand pat on their position, even though it is a good one. They have to engage the Indonesians in the war of political manoeuvre, with an eye to the United Nations and to opinion in Asian and African governments.
16. Secondly, there is evidence that the Philippines are behaving more reasonably and are making an effort to find some solution acceptable to both parties. Macapagal seems to regard the present proposals as a last effort to determine Indonesian intentions and find out if they really want a peaceful settlement. If they do not, and the summit ends in failure, then the blame will rest with the Indonesians (Savingram 4).5 Macapagal may be a little naive in thinking that the blame will be so apparent, but it would seem unwise not to take a kindly look at his present efforts.
17. Mr. Butler has taken a permissive, if not an encouraging view of them. Significantly, he told Cutts that the United Kingdom was heavily over-committed with active operations in four parts of the world, and he felt every effort would have to be made to avoid additional burdens in Malaysia. The United States has worked hard in recent weeks to get acceptance by the three parties of the Lopez proposals (indeed, there is reason to think that the United States helped to inspire them) and can be expected to favour the latest initiative.
18. The Malaysians, after an electoral triumph, are in better form to go to a summit now than they were at the beginning of the year. They gave better than they got at the two Bangkok meetings and surprised the Indonesians by the force with which they expressed their position. What they learned then should stand them in good stead in the next round.
19. For these reasons, it would seem inadvisable for us to oppose the idea of a summit as now proposed by the Philippines. There would, however, be advantages in pointing out some of the obvious dangers to the Malaysians and perhaps in making some suggestions as to the organisation of the preparatory measures for the summit meeting. The Philippines’ proposals envisage some preparatory work. The Malaysians could use these meetings for a full and thorough exposition of just what has been happening in Borneo. They have ample evidence with which to make the Indonesian position difficult. And they can press the Indonesians for some clarification of the ‘schedule of withdrawals’ of forces from Malaysian Borneo, which Sukarno has said he is prepared to carry out when the talks start. Given the nature of the operations any talk of ‘phased withdrawal’ is misleading, and the Malaysians should be able to press the Indonesians on this point. They will, of course, face the problem of the supervision of any guarantees which the Indonesians may give. The Tunku seems to be thinking that the Thais might still provide a supervisory team. The Thais themselves seem to be disenchanted with the idea. But the Malaysians should be able to work for some commitment to withdraw which can be used later against the Indonesians if they do not observe it.
20. In a telegram sent to London on the 7th May, Mr. Butler said that in his message to the Tunku (in which he commended the latest Philippine initiative) he had omitted mention of a Philippine suggestion for an Asian-African group being nominated by the three Maphilindo countries to consider ways of finding a solution to the present situation. This idea was floated by the Filipinos about three months ago. It was suggested that each of the parties should nominate one country, and that the three so nominated would name a fourth to join them in studying the situation and making recommendations for a solution. The objections to this idea are obvious. Malaysia’s nominee would be outnumbered. The Indonesians, who are adept at this sort of manipulation, might find ways and means of bringing pressure to bear on the committee to come up with the right recommendations. Their recent deal with Pakistan over the question of an invitation to Malaysia to attend the Second Asian-African Conference is an example of their tactics.)6 Secondly, the committee would feel obliged to come up with some compromise which, on the surface, would save face all around, but which, if acceptable to Indonesia, would be more likely to impair Malaysia’s interests than Indonesia’s. Indonesia does not appear willing to forego physical pressure unless the alternative means of pursuing her aims offer good promise. We do not agree with the view that the mere establishment of the Asian Committee would be a face-saver, enabling Sukarno to say Malaysia was now an Asian creation. A suggestion made some time ago was that this Asian-African Committee might itself conduct or might recommend yet another ascertainment in the Borneo States. Indonesia, of course, has been calling for another ascertainment since the report of the last one came out. Thirdly, Indonesia would have succeeded to some degree in extricating itself from the position of an ‘aggressor’ and become instead a party to a dispute with legislative rights and interests.
21. Mr. Butler also said that the present idea of an Asian-African Committee does not include reascertainment in its terms of reference, but that reascertainment would not necessarily be excluded from its terms of reference. This, he said, is a point which the Malaysians could argue, and anyway it is less objectionable than the recent Japanese proposal for reascertainment.7 It is not clear whether this is a display of greater tactical flexibility on the part of the British or a development of substance. We had understood that they opposed any idea of reascertainment on the grounds that (i) it would call into question the validity of the constitutional processes by which Malaysia was formed, and also the report of the Secretary-General, and (ii) it would be an invitation to the Indonesians to try to influence the outcome.
22. There is also the question of timing. If British and Malaysian forces engage in ‘hot pursuit’, border counter-fire or harassment, it would be unfortunate if this were to occur between the time that a summit had been announced and before it had taken place. On the other hand, successful harassment of Indonesian border positions might them more amenable to negotiation. Thus, any firm decision about a summit would need to be related to the decision on the timing of hot pursuit and counter-fire.
23. To sum up, Critchley might be told that we would need to avoid crossing wires with the British; that we should not wish to oppose a favourable Malaysian response to Macapagal’s initiative, but should concentrate any advice we give on seeing that the Malaysians give proper weight to the presentation of their policy, and in helping them to analyse the implications and possible dangers of the various courses.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/9 part 7]
1 Hasluck had taken over the External Affairs portfolio on 24 April following Barwick’s appointment as Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia.
2 Critchley had reported that he believed the Malaysians would continue to insist on the withdrawal of Indonesian forces before any summit meeting, and that the Tunku had said he would only attend a summit if the ministerial meeting was successful.
3 Butler had become UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on Douglas-Home’s acceptance of the Prime Ministership (see footnote 2, Document 140). He had visited Manila following his attendance at the twice yearly Anglo-Japanese consultative talks in Tokyo, 1–5 May.
4 Razak, Ismail, and Ghazali.
5 4 March, from Manila. Macapagal expressed this view during a discussion with Cutts on the impressions he had gained during his recent visit to Indonesia. Cutts also reported Macapagal as saying that if the summit failed, ‘the Malaysians’ international position would be strengthened while the Philippines would be obliged to make appropriate adjustments in its policies’.
6 At the Afro-Asian Preparatory Conference which had opened in Jakarta on 11 April, Pakistan had played an anti-Malaysia role and opposed Malaysia’s attendance at the second conference in return for Indonesia’s support for Pakistan on Kashmir.
7 The Japanese had proposed that Indonesian recognition of Malaysia could be contingent on a 1970 ascertainment by the Malaysians in the Borneo states.