Canberra, 3 July 1964
3245. Top Secret
The Cabinet has considered Sir Alec Douglas-Home’ s message of 23rd June about the possible requirement of the Commonwealth Brigade as further reinforcements for Borneo.2
2. The Defence Committee reported that the military necessity to commit the Australian battalion of the Commonwealth Brigade to Borneo at this stage has not been shown.3 This view is endorsed by the Chief of the General Staff who has just returned from South East Asia.4 After close examination, the Cabinet has accepted the conclusion of the Defence Committee on this point.
3. The message from the United Kingdom Prime Minister refers to the possible use of the Commonwealth Brigade in Borneo, whereas in earlier approaches the use of the Australian battalion, in rotation with other battalions of the Brigade, has been sought. If the whole Brigade were deployed to operations in Borneo it would make it virtually unavailable for SEATO operations within the timings known to be necessary for SEATO plans. If individual battalions were used rotationally in Borneo the availability of the Brigade for SEATO would be significantly weakened; we have in mind particularly the difficulties in disengaging a battalion and transporting it by air to a new deployment area to meet a SEATO threat.
4. We recognised that in this the views of the United States were of first class importance and that we would not undertake a commitment without having ascertained them. From your recent discussions with Johnson, Rusk and McNamara, you will of course be au fait with them.5 But in any event the Brigade being related to our SEATO commitments we are not free agents and in the situations contemplated in 3 it would appear necessary for us to canvass the impact on the SEATO strategic position.
5. Cabinet felt that in a situation short of overt aggression it would be important to assess further the policy involved in such use from the Australian point of view to see whether our own interests would be best served by commitment of the Australian battalion to Borneo. It was felt that a reply to Home pointing to the present lack of military need for the Brigade in Borneo should be careful to avoid the interpretation that if military need demanded it, it would necessarily be acceptable to Australia.
6. We considered the difficult situation which could arise following commitment of the Australian battalion to Borneo and subsequent clashes with Indonesian troops. Indonesia would, no doubt, charge Australia with aggressive action, especially if by that time Malaysian security forces were themselves engaging in cross border harassment. Indonesia could organise retaliatory incidents even with nationalistic West Irians, cross border raids and general harassment in the New Guinea border regions. While these would not constitute a real military threat they might give rise to an immediate and irresistible clamour in Australia for the posting of Australian troops to meet what the public would regard as an imminent threat of invasion. This over-commitment of forces in the New Guinea area could create further military difficulties for us and might not be in the general interest.
7. We felt that in your discussions in London you will no doubt wish to refer to the substantial military assistance which Australia is already furnishing to Malaysia.6 A summary of this is included in the Defence Committee Report, a final copy of which was sent in Tuesday’ s bag.
8. We decided that we should let you have the foregoing comments. You of course will not feel bound to these views but will have them in your mind during your discussions.
9. I personally feel it highly desirable that you endeavour to reach agreement with Holyoake that he would not deploy combat troops in Borneo except after full consultation with us. This is to guard against our hand being forced by him or the embarrassment of not following him.
[NAA: A6706, 35]
1 McEwen was Acting Prime Minister in Menzies’ absence at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference.
2 With the failure of the Tokyo summit, Douglas-Home had written to Menzies that the UK Government believed that Indonesia would ‘ step up their military “confrontation” in Borneo still further’ . He hoped that the forces currently in Borneo could ‘ hold the situation’ , but that it was ‘ possible that further reinforcements may soon be needed’ . Cabinet considered the message on 1 July.
3 The Defence Committee examined the need for Australian forces for the defence of Malaysia in light of this further approach by the UK in Meeting No. 44/1964 on 29 June.
4 Lieutenant General Sir John Wilton.
5 Menzies had visited Washington and New York for talks in the last week of June en route to London.
6 For example, see Documents 149 and 151.