Kuala Lumpur, 3 September 1964
935. Secret Priority
Indonesian Paratroop Landing
Our telegram 930.1
Malaysians called an emergency meeting September 2nd to discuss the situation. Present were – Tunku, Razak, Ismail, Fenner,2 Tunku Osman,3 Ghazali, Nik Daud,4 Head, Wade and myself.
2. Fenner explained that the Indonesians had dropped 14 regular Indonesians and 15 Indonesian-trained Malaysians (not forty as earlier reported) in three groups made up as follows –
(a) 1 officer, 4 PGT5 and 10 Malaysians
(b) 1 Sergeant-Major, 4 PGT and 2 Malaysians
(c) 1 Corporal, 4 PGT and 2 Malaysians.6
Contact had been established and was continuing. One Indonesian had been killed and two Indonesians and three Malaysians (Chinese) had been captured. Four crates had also been taken consisting of rice and arms and ammunition.
3. The Malaysians insisted that they would have to react strongly as otherwise the Indonesians would be encouraged to continue their aggression. The infiltration of an increasing number of Indonesians could lead to a serious deterioration in the security situation and a fall in Malaysian morale.
4. Razak, Ismail and Fenner strongly favoured early retaliation against camps in Sumatra where Indonesians were preparing themselves and training Malaysians for infiltration operations. Razak explained that as retaliatory action would depend upon Commonwealth forces, the meeting had been called so that High Commissioners could express their views.
5. The Malaysians said they wanted air raids on the Sumatran camps rather than commando-style raids which could not be mounted quickly. When I suggested that British air raids were likely to be followed by Indonesian air raids and that there would be a great danger of escalation, Fenner suggested eliminating the Indonesian Air Force as the first step.
6. Tunku exercised a restraining influence. He said he would declare a state of emergency so that the infiltrators could be dealt with summarily, but he did not like the idea of air attacks on Indonesia which would be likely to lead to raids on Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.
7. Tunku was against an emergency appeal to the Security Council. He explained that on his recent tour Rusk and others had strongly advised against taking a complaint to the Council where any possibility of a useful resolution would be removed by Russian veto. This view appeared to have general support among the Malaysians. Ismail argued strongly that reference to the Council unless associated with retaliatory military operations against Indonesians would be disadvantageous. Malaysia would be likely to have its hands tied by a Good Offices Committee and by interference from the Afro-Asians. It was agreed, however, that in addition to a strong protest to Indonesia, through Thailand, a complaint should also be filed with the President of the Security Council.
8. In the course of general discussion the Malaysians and the Tunku in particular expressed some dissatisfaction with Britain’s indecisiveness in dealing with Indonesian incursions and their failure to provide an effective deterrent. Head pointed out that this was hardly fair since the Malaysians had not yet made a specific official request. He suggested that perhaps the most effective way in which the Malaysians could react to the paratroopers’ raid would be to issue a clear warning to Indonesia that if provocatory attacks continued retaliatory action would be taken on Indonesian soil.
9. It was agreed that the N.O.C.7 should meet tomorrow afternoon to decide what retaliatory measures should be recommended to Cabinet which would meet immediately afterwards. The understanding was that the Malaysian Government might then ask the British Government whether they would be prepared to take the retaliatory action proposed. If they agreed, the Malaysians could then issue a direct warning to Indonesia. Head said that at the earliest a British decision was hardly possible before the beginning of next week.
10. I had the impression that Australia and New Zealand would be asked to support, and share consequences of the retaliatory action.
11. My strong personal feeling is that in the present circumstances the Indonesians might welcome British retaliation on Indonesian soil and that they could mount an international campaign to exploit it. I continue to believe that the Malaysians are unwise not to use the opportunity of today’s raid and the statements which are being made in Djakarta8 to support a strong appeal to the Security Council. Any further delay will weaken their case and it would certainly be compromised by an overt British attack on Indonesian territory. As I see it the Malaysians should seek a firm commitment from the British as a basis for publicly warning Indonesia and should then complain to the Security Council fortified with the British assurance that any further aggression would be answered forcibly.
[NAA: A1945, 245/3/12]
1 2 September, advising that 40 paratroops had been dropped in the Labis area of North Johore at around 2.00 a.m. that day.
2 C. Harry Fenner, Inspector General of Police in Malaysia
3 Lieutenant General Tunku Osman bin Tunku Mohammed Jewa, Chief of Staff of the Malaysian Armed Forces.
4 Dato Aria D’Raja Nik Daud, Permanent Secretary, Malaysian Ministry of Home Affairs.
5 Pasukan Gerak Tjepat —Quick Action Force, Indonesian Air Force
6 The discrepancy between paratroop numbers recorded in the first sentence of paragraph 2 and those identified in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) is in the original document.
7 Malaysian National Operations Committee.
8 In his annual Merdeka Day address on 17 August, Sukarno had declared the ensuing year to be ‘The Year of Living Dangerously’.