Canberra, 17 September 1964
635. Secret Immediate
Malaysia
We assume active consideration is being given by members of the Council to the position which arises if the Norwegian resolution is vetoed.1 The discussion could lapse at that point and the Council simply remain formally seized of the matter. This might be interpreted as a ‘failure’ on the part of the Malaysians despite the number of favourable votes for the vetoed resolution.2
2. At the minimum we would hope that statements in the Council after the loss of the resolution would reflect the views of the members that the matter remains the continuing concern of the Council. But this would scarcely impress public opinion in the various sensitive regions. Accordingly we wonder if thought is being given to some type of procedural resolution which formally expresses the Council’s intention to keep the matter under review. Whether some additional ingredient could be worked into such a resolution such as authorising the Secretary-General to provide observers or report on any incident at the request of either party is, of course, doubtful but worthy of consideration.
3. In any wind-up statements referred to above we would, of course, attach particular importance to a firm United States’ statement.
[NAA: A1838, 3034/9/1 part 2]
1 In a bid to avoid the Soviet veto, Malaysia had hoped that the Ivory Coast would sponsor a draft resolution that was acceptable to them. On 15 September, the Ivory Coast relinquished its attempt to draft a resolution (being unable to meet Indonesian demands and unwilling to sponsor a draft unacceptable to them), and Norway submitted a draft that closely resembled the draft prepared by the Malaysians (see Document 207). The operative parts of the resolution requested each party to refrain from the threat or use of force and to respect each other’s political and territorial integrity, and recommended that the parties resume talks on the basis of the Tokyo communique. The resolution also asked that, when established, the reconciliation commission provided for in the communique should report to the Security Council (see editorial note, 1964 Tripartite Talks ).
2 On 16 September, Hay had advised Jockel by telephone that it was expected that there would be from seven to nine votes in favour of the resolution when it was taken on 17 September.