209

Cablegram from Hay to Canberra

New York, 17 September 1964

UN919. Secret Immediate

Malaysia

Your 635.1

In the light of today’s vote, Indonesians and Russians will find some difficulty in convincing representatives at the United Nations that Malaysians have ‘failed’ because of the Russian veto.2 It is true that Indonesians have not been placed under an obligation to do the things enjoined by the draft resolution. But they are under moral pressure to abide by its terms. As seen here the result of the voting on the Norwegian resolution represents a notable success for Malaysia.

2.

We discussed with British and Americans the pros and cons of a procedural resolution as suggested in your telegram. They had not previously considered it. Their reaction was that while desirable it would be difficult to organize (particularly with the Russians in the Chair) and might be exploited in unfavourable directions. Both delegations agreed that reference to the Council’s continuing concern should be included in their explanation of votes, and satisfactory references were in fact made as follows.

Stevenson3 said that despite this veto the Security Council remained seized of the problem brought before it by Malaysia and would continue to follow the manner in which the parties carried out their obligations under the Charter ‘as unequivocally defined by nine members of the Council’.

Dean4 said that the Council could not wash its hands of the matter which remained within the Council’s competence and sphere of responsibility.

[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 29]

1 Document 208.

2 The Security Council had voted nine to two in Malaysia’s favour, with Czechoslovakia being the only other member to support the Soviet veto.

3 Adlai Stevenson, US Ambassador to the UN and US Representative on the Security Council.

4 Sir Patrick Dean, UK Permanent Representative at the UN, and UK Representative on the Security Council and on the Trusteeship Council.