Canberra, 19 September 1964
4535. Top Secret Immediate
Following is copy of a message to Home sent through British High Commission channels today.
Begins:—
Message to—Sir Alec Douglas-Home
From—Sir Robert Menzies
Thank you for your message of 18th September, in reply to my message of 13th September, 1964, on Indonesian infiltration into Malaysia.1
We had been on the point of sending you a reply to your message when we heard of the letter of the Malaysian Prime Minister to our three High Commissioners. This letter, of course, puts a new complexion on the immediate situation, by indicating that the Tunku may be reluctant to make the formal request referred to in your message.2
However, so that you will know how we feel on the question of consultation, I think I should let you know that we would not feel happy about a delegation to Lord Head to authorise without consultation the first stage of military action in response to Indonesian landings or attacks. The consequences of his decision could of course involve the employment of our forces. We would be in a difficult public position at this end if we had to admit that we had not been consulted at the relevant time. You will, of course, realise that we have no desire to stand aside, and no intention to do so. But the carefully considered terms of our recent assurance to Malaysia clearly envisaged that we would share in a decision about the response to further Indonesian attacks. I am sure you will appreciate that, in the event of initial counter-action it would be essential for me in the Australian Parliament to be able to say that the Australian Government had been effectively consulted.
I believe we could draw a distinction between the essential requirement that this initial decision be taken by Governments and on the other hand the delegation of possible subsequent decisions when, in your words, the risk of unacceptable damage to our military capacity might arise. In our view, that state of affairs would arise, in the sequence of events we are considering, only at the phase of the Indonesian military response along the lines described in your paragraphs five and six.3
We had also intended to raise with you the period of time that would be available from the moment at which our Governments first become aware of an attack until the point of decision to authorise the first limited counter-attack. In our view, verification of any attack would have to be made with care and accuracy, both for our own purposes and for ensuring a sound international opinion. This process would occupy enough time to allow of speedy but effective consultation. The Tunku’s letter should now give time for this aspect to be further examined.
It seems to me that we will all be assisted by the further development of the views of the Malaysian Government.
Ends.
[NAA: A1838, TS687/9/2 part 1]
1 In his reply to the 13 September message (Document 206), Douglas-Home endeavoured to address the Australian Government’s concerns about being consulted before Australian forces were deployed. He pointed out that for effective action to be taken to meet Indonesian attacks which might come without warning, and so as ‘not to run unacceptable risks’, there would not be time for consultation even with London. In such circumstances timing was important in taking prompt counter-action and Douglas-Home advised Menzies that to achieve this the UK Government had delegated discretion to their High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur to act ‘without further reference’ to London, provided that the Malaysian Government made a formal request for counter-action; that CINCFE confirmed the attacks on Malaya or Singapore; and that the Australian and New Zealand High Commissioners and the US Ambassador were informed ‘immediately’ the Malaysian request was received. However, in the case of an air attack, where a second attack could closely follow the first, timing was of ‘supreme importance’ and the last proviso would not apply before counter-action was taken.
2 On 18 September, Head, Critchley and Wade received a letter from Tunku Abdul Rahman reading: ‘In view of our moral victory in the Security Council, I feel very strongly that we should not take any retaliatory action against Indonesia except for some major operation carried out by her besides the landing of troops, either by sea or by air. At this stage 1 feel that we have got the support of the Afro-Asian countries and we must not lose it by hasty action.’
3 Paragraphs five and six dealt with Indonesian attacks on ‘airfields or other essential military or a major city in Malaya or Singapore’.