Canberra, 30 September 1964
803. Confidential Priority
Malaysia
Your telegram 737.1
We are at present reviewing our attitude towards political negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia, and hope to be able to provide general guidance shortly.
2. Since the Security Council Meeting, Tunku has received messages from Sukarno about an early meeting, and he has responded by offering to meet with an intermediary.2 We have the impression, however, that the Indonesians may not be pursuing this concretely but leaving it ‘in the air’. It seems likely that secret contacts between the Malaysians and the Indonesians will continue, although the Tunku has made it plain that he has to be convinced Sukarno is sincere in wanting a peaceful settlement and definitely prepared to give up confrontation before he will attend a summit meeting. The Indonesians are at the same time trying to build up support for an Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission and will no doubt press hard for this at the Cairo Non-Aligned Conference.
3. In broad terms, in our view Malaysia has made it clear that it is prepared to have political talks with Indonesia under the proper conditions; Malaysia has a realistic and sound view of the need to find a basis for future relationship with Indonesia; if President Sukarno wants a settlement he should be prepared to cease infiltrations and attacks and cease proclaiming his right to have forces in Malaysian territory; until he takes these steps, Malaysia cannot be expected to negotiate under the threat of force.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/9 part 15]
1 29 September, in which McIntyre had sought Australia’s ‘latest thinking’ on the Malaysia–Indonesian dispute in preparation for a meeting on the issue with the Japanese Vice Foreign Minister and former Ambassador to Indonesia, Takio Oda, on 1 October.
2 On 16 September, Tunku Abdul Rahman advised that he had received two messages that Sukarno wished to meet him secretly ( ‘without the Philippines’) to discuss the ending of confrontation, and that ‘although he had no faith at all in Sukarno’s ability to keep to any agreement, he did not believe Malaysia could afford to reject overtures of this kind’. He intended to meet Indonesia’s Ambassador to Burma who was to come to Malaysia with Sukarno’s proposals in writing.