Kuala Lumpur, 6 October 1964
1077. Top Secret Guard Priority
Head and I had a long talk with the Tunku and Ghazali this morning (October 6th).
2. Tunku said he saw clearly that Afro-Asian conciliation efforts were likely to lead to pressure on Malaysia to agree to a plebiscite in the Borneo territories. He himself was sure that the proper course was to stand firm but the issue could be war or peace and Malaysia lacking adequate strength had to depend on her friends to do the fighting. In the circumstances, he was not sure whether he was justified in resisting the pressures for a plebiscite.
3. Ghazali, Head and I spoke at some length on the dangers and uncertainties that would be created by a plebiscite irrespective of how and when it would be held. We also pointed out that agreement to hold one could be expected to encourage and facilitate Indonesian policies against Malaysia. Tunku acknowledged these arguments and said he would be guided by what his allies thought. He asked Head and me to seek urgent confirmation that our governments would not be averse to him refusing to agree to a plebiscite. I have also passed on Tunku’s request that Wade should seek a similar assurance from the New Zealand Government.
4. Tunku also favoured asking the Americans what they thought about a plebiscite. However, when Head, Ghazali and I pointed out that it could be dangerous to encourage the Americans to believe that a plebiscite might be acceptable, Tunku agreed that they could be sounded after the opinions of the Commonwealth Governments had been obtained. Head and I feel that if the Americans are sounded, it should be with discretion. For example, Malaysia could inform the United States that it is unable to agree to a plebiscite and would welcome an assurance that the United States understands and accepts this position.
5. Tunku had suggested that unless Malaysia was prepared to agree to a plebiscite there would be no point in a conciliation commission since it would surely fail. Head, Ghazali and I therefore found it necessary to stress that it might be difficult to reject an Afro-Asian proposal for a conciliation commission and that if appropriate conditions were established such a commission might work to Malaysia’s advantage. We pointed out that Malaysia could reasonably refuse mediation if it involved negotiation of her sovereignty and that she was supported in this by the terms of the recent resolution in the Security Council. I pointed out that rather than adopt a negative attitude, Malaysia could, if necessary, make its own counter proposals to a conciliation commission in a form that would put Indonesia on the defensive. I also emphasised that the best way to avoid pressure for a plebiscite would be to make it patently clear from the outset that this was unacceptable.
6. With your 914 in mind,1 I asked the Tunku whether there was any change in his views on what Indonesia should do as a basis for further negotiations. He said there was no change. Indonesia had to respect Malaysian territorial integrity and withdraw her forces from Malaysian soil. Nevertheless, I have the impression that in certain circumstances Tunku would be prepared to gloss over the issue provided there was some recognition by Indonesia of the principle of respect for Malaysian territory.
7. Tunku told me of the approach to Lee Kuan Yew as reported in paragraph 2 of our 1039.2 He gave me the impression that the invitation was for Lee to meet the Indonesian Ambassador to the Philippines in Hong Kong. He also confirmed that he had suggested that Lee send a representative to find out what the Indonesians had in mind.
8. At my instigation, Tunku confirmed that in the event of another important incursion into the Malayan peninsula arrangements as set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of my 1049 would apply.3 However, he thought that if incursions were small and easily contained, Malaysia would not need to respond beyond reporting the incidents to the Security Council. Only if an incursion were serious and the evidence easy to demonstrate would he favour calling for an emergency meeting of the Council. In these circumstances it might also be necessary to consider whether retaliatory action should be taken. Head mentioned that Dean believed that another Security Council appeal could have advantages for Malaysia. I agree that Malaysia should continue her efforts to strengthen her international position. I suggested that the Indonesian warship raid on Malaysian fishing boats over the weekend and the Indonesian incursions into Borneo that had taken place since the Security Council meeting should be reported and circulated to members of the Security Council. The Tunku agreed. He also reminded Ghazali that he wanted to send another letter to the participants in the non-aligned conference reporting these acts of aggression since the Security Council meeting.
9. I assume that there will be no problem in giving the Tunku the confirmation requested in paragraph 3. His request may, however, provide an opportunity for sending a message that will sustain him in the difficult months ahead. If Malaysia decides to make clear to the A fro-Asians her objection to a plebiscite, I think it is also important that the reasons for doing so should be stated clearly and carefully.
[NAA: A1209, 1964/6715]
1 25 September. It asked Critchley’s views on whether the question of the withdrawal of forces should continue to be a major issue in considering future Maiaysian–Indonesian talks, given the success in rounding up the infiltrators into Malaya and that only about 100 infiltrators remained scattered in Sabah and Sarawak.
2 26 September, in which Vawdrey advised that no arrangements had been confirmed for the Tunku to meet with an Indonesian emissary, although four messages had now been received. However, the Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister had sent a message to Lee Kwan Yew suggesting a meeting in Hong Kong to discuss the reopening of talks.
3 29 September. It contained Critchley’s report of the procedures to be followed if another Indonesian incursion was made into the Malayan Peninsula. On receipt of a report, the Tunku would first discuss with the three High Commissioners what he intended to recommend to Cabinet. The Tunku’s proposed recommendation was then to be sent to the three Commonwealth governments ‘so that there would be concerted agreement on action to be taken as soon as Cabinet had made its decision … and the incident had been verified’. Critchley also advised that the Tunku favoured appealing to the Security Council unless the Indonesians made a major attack; and that Head interpreted his authority to approve a Malaysian request for deterrent military operations, without consultation with London, as applying only when the scale and nature of the assault required an immediate military response.