Canberra, 9 October 1964
4874. Secret
Malaysia: Afro-Asian Conciliation
Please convey the following views in answer to the British request, conveyed through the High Commissioner’s Office here concerning the question of a plebiscite in the Borneo States as discussed in Kuala Lumpur on 6th October. Critchley’s telegram No. 1077 refers.2
2. Any Indonesian suggestions for a plebiscite in the Borneo States must be viewed with considerable scepticism. In his recent feelers to the Tunku, Sukarno seems to have referred vaguely to a plebiscite in five years’ time as a way out of present problems. But in Pakistan he seems to have reiterated in full Indonesia’s political demands concerning a settlement.3 Nothing concrete has evidently emerged about the conduct of a plebiscite, the choices which would be offered, or the time at which it would be held. In present circumstances proposals by Indonesia for a plebiscite must be interpreted as a continuation of the policy of seeking the disruption of Malaysia. A plebiscite which is an instrument of Indonesian policy would:—
(a) affirm Indonesia’s right to a voice in major political changes in neighbouring areas (note the significance of this to Australia);
(b) reduce the standing of the Secretary-General’s report on self-determination in the Borneo States;4
(c) cause a revival of concern among the peoples of the Borneo States and among the Chinese generally that the Tunku is unable to protect them against Indonesia;
(d) open the way for Indonesia to interfere heavily in the internal affairs of the Borneo States under the guise of plebiscite arrangements. For example, Indonesia could make demands for the withdrawal of ‘colonialist’ military forces so that the elections could be free; for the release of anti-Malaysia political detainees to take part in proceedings; and for large numbers of Indonesian observers, and so forth.
3. It is difficult to envisage circumstances in which these risks would not exist. In particular, it is difficult to give much credence to any suggestion that Sukarno would settle for a notional arrangement for a plebiscite after a period of years.
4. In spite of these considerations, we agree with the British view that we do not see that the Tunku is, in present circumstances, called upon to pronounce one way or the other and it would be a mistake to try to do so. We have the following considerations in mind in reaching this conclusion:—
(i) It is well worth our while that the Tunku should respond as far as practicable to any renewed interest which Sukarno is showing in negotiations. We do not wish to see Sukarno pushed into a comer where he has no choices other than humiliation or intensified military pressure. The Tunku is now in a stronger position internationally and may be able to employ flexible tactics. His main point should be to insist that the right atmosphere be first created before conciliation procedures can be accepted and to express willingness to talk to Indonesia whenever the latter ceases its acts of hostility.
(ii) We think that the Tunku is overstating the position when he says that unless Malaysia was prepared to agree to a plebiscite there would be no point in a conciliation commission. We agree with paragraph 5 of Critchley’s telegram.
(iii) If such a commission should eventually come into existence, it would perhaps then be time enough for the Tunku to define the Malaysian position concerning a plebiscite. We believe that the Malaysians would be able to argue strongly that they have already had recourse to international processes in order to determine the wishes of the people of the States concerned and that they are entitled to stand firm on such processes as a protection against the unilateral demands of a more powerful neighbour. Also, something might be made of Indonesia’s own position under the West Irian agreement.5
(iv) In general, the Malaysians would be unwise to give any impression of going back on their agreement to the establishment of an Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission under certain conditions. Moreover, it is conceivable that its establishment might help in turning confrontation onto a less dangerous course.
5. For Critchley. You might discuss these points with Head and Wade with a view to developing a common approach.
[NAA: A1209, 1964/6715]
1 Repeated to Kuala Lumpur 977.
2 Document 218. On receipt of Head’s report of the discussions, the CRO had set out British reactions to the plebiscite question and requested Australian and New Zealand views on the issue.
3 Sukarno had been in Pakistan around 20–22 September as part of a series of short visits to countries in the Afro-Asian Conference and the Afro-Asian Islamic Conference. Sukarno was looking to gain international support for Indonesia’s position, particularly following the Security Council vote of 17 September.
4 See editorial note, UN Malaysia Mission.
5 See footnote 6, Document 85.