Canberra, 16 October 1964
Top Secret
My purpose in writing to you is to provide you with a broad statement of government policy which I should wish you to follow in carrying out the important responsibilities which fall upon you in the course of your consultations with the Malaysian Government.
You will appreciate that the decisions which are made in Kuala Lumpur, in the event of further Indonesian attacks, could have such grave consequences as an essentially British–Australian war with Indonesia. This would, of course, profoundly affect Malaysian–Indonesian and Australian–Indonesian relationships for years to come as well as having possible serious adverse consequences in Indonesia’s internal political trends. We must, therefore, exercise our rights and our obligations in order to ensure that what we consider to be the right decisions are made. My telegram No. 945 of 2nd October stressed the importance of your participation in the processes of verification and assessment of incidents and, also, of consultation.1
I should like you to maintain your close relationship with the Malaysian Prime Minister, during the present uncertain period about Indonesian military intentions, in order to give him support in the careful and responsible view which he holds about overt military counter-action against Indonesia. You will appreciate that we in Australia do not qualify our earlier assurances of military support but are anxious only to ensure that courses are taken, whether by military action or by discussion, which will best serve the final objective, namely the maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Malaysia in conditions that will enable Malaysia to progress in peace and, if possible, the establishing of better relations with Indonesia.
It seems to us that, in your talks with the Tunku, you could expound the view that the firm, defensive policy which Malaysia and its allies have pursued has brought solid successes. President Sukarno has long since had to discard the fiction of supporting Malaysian dissidents and has had to resort to open, aggressive attacks by his regular Armed Forces. His international reputation has suffered heavily, as shown in the Security Council, and the reports from Cairo indicate that he has not succeeded in his mission at the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations.2 Militarily, by his reckless attacks on the Malayan peninsula, President Sukarno exposed his country to a humiliating defeat. There is no doubt that the swift and effective measures which were taken to destroy the infiltrators have impressed the outside world as a demonstration of Malaysia’s national strength.
There are indications, too, that the possibility of prompt reprisal may have had some effect on Indonesian thinking. Success of the deterrent will probably be seen in limiting Indonesian acts in size and frequency to a scale below that which would justify major reprisals. While force must be maintained as a deterrent, a policy of readiness to retaliate requires the greatest possible care over verification of any incidents reported and in determining that their nature is so serious as to justify and require reprisal.
It is because of such considerations that, leaving aside a verified and dangerous act of wanton aggression which presented a situation that could only be dealt with by military means, we share the Tunku’s preference for going back to the Security Council as the aggrieved party in the event of further attacks. A further attack by President Sukarno would place him in open defiance of United Nations opinion. On the first occasion, Indonesia sought to justify actions which it had already taken and the Council found against it. In the light of the Council’s consideration, renewed attacks would represent an unprecedented challenge to the authority of the Council and the principles of the United Nations. On the other hand, we would have to accept that this position of advantage for Malaysia would not be achieved if there was to be military retaliation.
Nor would we dismiss the possibility of the Security Council adopting a resolution without there being a Russian veto. Russia would have a difficult decision to make in lending support to Indonesia in an act of open defiance of the United Nations. In addition, Russia might conceivably see the advantage of a resolution providing for a United Nations observer presence in order to minimise risks to her own position or reputation as Indonesia’s source of military aid and support.
While these last points are, of course, highly speculative, it seems to us apparent that there may well remain scope to gain advantage from international processes. I know that this is the view which you yourself formed in New York. The Malaysians should bear in mind, too, that they will be well placed internationally during the coming months when the General Assembly will be in session.
A particular object of policy in the coming weeks will be to ensure that Malaysia takes its place on the Security Council during the course of the General Assembly.3 Russia will be under pressure from Indonesia to break the ‘gentleman’s agreement’ and military retaliation could introduce a new and adverse factor for Malaysia’s prospects. In these circumstances there may be a larger audience for Indonesian propaganda that Malaysia’s dependence on Britain makes it unsuitable for election to the Security Council.
[NAA: A1838, TS687/9/2 part 1]
1 Hasluck had been concerned to avoid a situation where a ‘rapid decision’ to respond militarily ‘might be taken in an atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty and conflicting opinion’. He instructed Critchley to ‘work for arrangements (a) which ensure that we are immediately informed of an incident; (b) which enable you to be closely associated with the development of Malaysian thinking; (c) which leaves flexibility for rapid consultation and exchange of views’.
2 The Indonesians had made a poor impression at the Second Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo, 5–12 October, which had stressed respect for the sovereignty of nations. Most delegations had opposed Sukarno’s view that peace, co-existence and non-alignment should be subordinated to the struggle between the old and the new emerging forces.
3 Malaysia had been elected by the General Assembly to become one of the non-permanent members of the Security Council from 1965. The seat became available under a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ whereby Czechoslovakia served only one year of the two-year term.