Kuala Lumpur, 29 October 1964
1185. Secret Immediate
Indonesian Landing
My 1177.1
Those present at meeting called by Tunku this afternoon were Ghazali, Bottomley, Wade and myself.
2. Tunku reported briefly on events this morning. He said the landing had been reported by the vigilantes and that Security Forces had mounted operations without delay. Tunku’s preliminary report was less detailed than our 1184.2 Two landing boats were recovered. In one there were 15 haversacks, 6 mortar bombs, 1 mortar and a few grenades and two rolls of fuses. Tunku was of the opinion that situation was well under control and expected that most of the infiltrators would be eliminated within the next day or two.
3. Tunku Osman and Dr Ismail had both asked the Tunku whether he intended ‘to hit back’. Tunku said he himself favoured restraint and by coincidence a message from Abu Bakar of Nigeria3 had recently arrived urging him to ‘exercise restraint whatever the provocation’. As however, Commonwealth forces would be involved, he would like our views. I had the impression that Tunku was firmly opposed to mounting retaliation and was merely seeking our support.
4. I was sure the Australian Government would fully support him on the need to exercise restraint and asked whether any action was intended with the United Nations. Ghazali said that Malaysians had made a report not only to Security Council but regular circulation to all United Nations members. This was in accordance with policy of keeping all U.N. members informed of aggression against Malaysia without distinction between incidents in Borneo and on mainland.
5. I suggested that as the evidence mounted up, consideration might also be given to whether there might not be advantage for Malaysia in calling another emergency meeting of the Security Council. I mentioned some of the points in favour, as they appeared to me (e.g. opportunity to capitalise on Indonesia’s disregard of Security Council opinion and more recent views of non-aligned nations in Cairo).4
6. Bottomley and Wade expressed agreement. Bottomley suggested that in view of importance of tactics in any United Nations action, it would be desirable to seek views of missions in New York on appropriate timing of any appeal to Security Council. I believe Tunku and Ghazali would probably prefer not to make appeal on this incident but rather to build up case in expectation that farther Indonesian infiltrations will take place. They would however be influenced by our opinion. Tunku had called for further meeting for 12 noon tomorrow. Any views you may have on desirability of early appeal to Security Council would be appreciated.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 31]
1 29 October, in which Critchley reported that a seaborne landing had occurred that morning at Kuala Kesang on the border of Malacca and Johore, and that Australian forces of the CSR were taking part in the operation to deal with the incursion.
2 29 October. Critchley had advised that the strength of the force was approximately 57 (30 PGTs and 27 ‘volunteers’) from the same battalion that had landed at Labis and Pontian (see Documents 197 and 198). The infiltrators had split into two groups on landing, one of each side of the Kesang River with the object of linking up with the remnants of earlier groups of infiltrators.
3 Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria.
4 See footnote 2, Document 220.