Canberra, 9 November 1964
5359. Top Secret
Malaysia–Indonesia
Following are Departmental comments. You will be aware that an important statement by Soekamo is foreshadowed for 10th November (Heroes’ Day) and that there is the possibility of further military action to mark the occasion. What follows is accordingly subject to whatever may happen tomorrow.
2. We are worried about the atmosphere in Djakarta. The recent dissension between the PKI and religious and other groups, the state of excitement generated in the crush-Malaysia campaign, the difficulty withdrawing without appearing to climb down, the possibility of a mistimed operation, all make for danger. Subandrio recently remarked to Jones that the Indonesians must continue military incursions to prove that they are not intimidated by the British.2 We have done what we can to warn Indonesia about the consequences of military action against Malaysia but there is no sign of a change of policy. You will have seen Shann’s reports of his talks with Subandrio and Nasution.3
3. We know of the steps which the former British Government4 was proposing to take in response to feelers for secret British–Indonesian talks put forward by one of the most senior and influential members of the Indonesian Government (Chairul Saleh).5 This exercise has been in abeyance since the landing at Kesang. Saleh has repeated his idea in a talk with Shann being sent to you separately.6 We realise fully that this sort of approach bristles with possible traps, that it might be promoted by one faction in the Indonesian Government in order to score off another, or to make the Malaysians think that the British are going behind their back, and we know too that the Tunku is suspicious about any British–Indonesian talks, and that it is not easy to handle him in this frame of mind. Given all these caveats, there might be some value in allowing this unusual method of communication to proceed cautiously providing that no further attacks occur in the next couple of weeks. It might be possible for the British Government to use this channel as a means of reinforcing public warnings given by the previous Government about the consequences of further attacks on Malaya. We can also see value in the British opening up communications at various points in the Indonesian regime within which some differences of view exist about future courses of action.
4. It is the view of the new British Government (reported by Eastman in telegram 7402)7 that there should be a further meeting of the Security Council before any military counteraction occurs. The Tunku has expressed the same view. It seems to us that this policy may be difficult to maintain in two sets of circumstances. First, it is hard to see it applying in circumstances of overt Indonesian attacks, e.g. against radar installations, which could be read as foreshadowing further offensive air activity. You may wish to obtain clarification of British thinking. Secondly, even in situations short of this, we are concerned lest Malaysian frustration, pent up by a series of attacks to which there had been no counter-offensive, might suddenly burst out into demands for a strong military reaction. The demand for the leaflet raids, and the reaction of Razak and Brigadier Tunku Osman to counsels of caution, are indicative.8
5. Military retaliation carries with it a risk that Indonesia would respond with air attacks against Singapore or other major targets which in turn would take us into a Plan Addington situation.9
6. The British have not been told of your standing instructions to Critchley.10 A copy is held by Eastman.
[NAA: A1838, TS687/9/2 part 2]
1 Hasluck had left Australia on 19 October on an extensive overseas tour to Egypt, Europe, the UK, Canada, and the US. His itinerary included talks in London with the new Labour government—which under Harold Wilson’s leadership had come to power in the UK general election held on 15 October—prior to leading the Australian delegation to the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee, 17–20 November. He also held discussions in Washington and led the Australian delegation at the 19th session of the UN General Assembly in New York, 1–14 December.
2 Subandrio’s comment, 3 November, was made in response to a statement by Jones that the latest Indonesian landings in Malaya contravened Indonesian assurances that such military action would not take place during Sukarno’s absence abroad, and asked what Indonesia had expected to gain from undertaking them.
3 3 November. Subandrio had insisted that there would be no changes in Indonesia’s confrontation policy and that if Indonesia could not get the support of the non-aligned countries, it would look elsewhere for allies, including to China and Russia, ‘be they Communist or not’. Similarly, Nasution had said that ‘nothing could now be done to stop continuation and development of policy of confrontation against Malaysia’. He believed that Sukarno ‘was so committed in so many directions to the policy that he would be quite incapable of reversing it’, even if he wished to do so.
4 That is, Douglas-Home’s Conservative Party government.
5 In mid-October, Saleh had told the British Commercial Counsellor in Jakarta that the Malaysian issue would only be resolved through ‘secret discussions between Britain and Indonesia direct’. When told that Britain had no standing on the matter and that negotiations would have to be between Indonesia and Malaysia, Saleh had responded that he was only interested in ‘practicalities and not technicalities’.
6 On 6 November, Shann had reported that Saleh had told him ‘the parties really concerned’ in resolving the Malaysia problem were ‘the British and the Indonesians or perhaps the Commonwealth and the Indonesians’, as there was ‘no use in talking to the Tunku’.
7 30 October, reporting Wilson’s affirmation of the Tunku’s decision to send a strong letter to the Security Council rather than request military action in response to the Indonesian landings of 29 October (see Documents 221 and 222). Wilson asked the Tunku ‘to keep in close touch with him’ regarding future involvement of the Security Council, saying that he felt it was ‘essential’ to have a further meeting of the Council before military retaliation.
8 British officials had seen ‘no value and several disadvantages’ in a Malaysian plan of late October to drop leaflets into Indonesian bases from which attacks on Malaya had been launched. The purpose was to counter Indonesian propaganda that claimed Indonesian invasion successes and to ensure that ‘it would not be within their right [for future infiltrators] to deny their knowledge of the purpose for which they are sent’ to Malaysia. Razak and Osman had reacted angrily to the British assessment, claiming that Malaysia’s appeal to the Security Council had been made so that action could be taken against subsequent Indonesian attacks, and ‘now the British were backing down on the mildest of responses’. Conceding, the British had undertaken the drop in the early hours of 2 November.
9 A UK plan to destroy Indonesian air strike capability should it resort to air strikes against airfields, major cities or military targets in Malaya or Singapore.
10 Document 220.