Canberra, 10 November 1964
Top Secret
Further to my letter of 19th October, 1964,1 I am enclosing a copy of telegram No. 5359 sent to the Minister in London as background for his talks.2
We should be glad of any further impressions you may have formed of future Malaysian reaction to Indonesian attacks. We noted from your telegrams at the time of the latest landing that some elements in the Malaysian Government were apparently pressing for retaliation. How dependent are we on the Tunku personally for avoiding retaliation? Can it be said that a stable and reasonably predictable policy is in existence and well understood and supported by senior members of the Malaysian Government?
We also note that there are differing views, and presumably strongly held ones, on whether Indonesian prisoners of war should be hanged. Or has this issue settled down? We hope the Malaysians will be able to return to their diplomatic and political initiative on this matter which seemed to us to be useful in several respects.3
We appreciate that it is not possible to predict Malaysian responses with much confidence. Similarly, we are seeking to define a Departmental view on the question whether Indonesia would launch bombing attacks or bombardments after retaliation; we think it is probable that they would do so. But our requirement in this uncertain and highly charged situation is that you keep us closely advised of your views and impressions concerning any shifts or developments in Malaysian attitudes.
I am sending copies of this letter, with attachment, to Waller and Pritchett.
[NAA: A1838, TS687/9/2 part 2]
1 Covering letter for Document 220.
2 Document 224.
3 As a formal state of war did not yet exist between Indonesia and Malaysia, the Malaysian Government had decided to demonstrate the firm stand it would take against infiltrators by sentencing a non-uniformed captive to death. Ghazali and Ramani in particular had argued against this course of action, pointing out possible international repercussions and the risks of retaliation. On 22 October, Critchley had reported the Tunku’s decision to request a meeting with the Indonesians in Bangkok to discuss whether a state of armed conflict existed, giving the Indonesians ‘the awkward choice of having to admit aggression or jeopardise the lives of the Indonesian prisoners’. The Tunku also saw his approach as a possible precursor to direct Malaysian–Indonesian talks on wider Malaysia issues.