Kuala Lumpur, 6 January 1965
23. Confidential Priority
Reference my 18.1
My following telegram reports Tunku’s remarks to the press after Cabinet meeting this morning.2
2. Tunku told me this afternoon that he is preparing a draft submission to the United Nations which he would discuss with Bottomley, Wade and me tomorrow evening at 11 p.m
3. Bottomley’s view, which I share, is that the report should set out appropriate evidence of the Indonesian build-up and the indications that a serious attack may be imminent. It could then say that the Malaysians with the help of their Commonwealth allies would defend themselves to the utmost and that they would look to the United Nations for proper support and assistance in this eventuality.
4. It would seem unwise for Malaysia to attempt to suggest what specific assistance the United Nations might render. I also believe that we should dissuade Malaysians from asking for an emergency meeting of the Security Council at this time.
5. As I surmised, Tunku was not consulted in advance about this morning’s press announcement (para 2 of my telegram 18)3 and blew up when he saw it. Origin of the two courses proposed in this announcement was Ramani, who when asked by the Ministry of External Affairs what the United Nations might do, had given them as possibilities.
6. Malaysians are irritated that British announced reinforcements without consulting them and without giving them opportunity to publicise request.4
7. I should be glad of any views on how Malaysians might report to United Nations in time for tomorrow’s meeting.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/9/1 part 5]
1 See footnote 1, Document 230.
2 Not published.
3 Tunku Ngah, the Deputy Secretary of External Affairs, had told the press that there were two courses open to Malaysia at the UN: (a) to request a UN peacekeeping force; or (b) to request an emergency meeting of the Security Council to condemn Indonesian aggression.
4 On 1 January the Tunku had asked Wilson to consider ‘more positive action in carrying out operations along Bomeo-lndonesian border’. Wilson replied on 2 January that he agreed and that CINCFE had been asked to attend a meeting in London on 12 January ‘to discuss the problem personally’. He also advised the Tunku that he was reinforcing the forces in Sarawak immediately, with the necessary replacements leaving the UK over the next few days, and providing additional naval personnel to man reserve patrol vessels in Singapore. The UK Ministry of Defence had announced on 31 December the immediate reinforcement of British forces in Malaysia by two battalions.