Canberra, 7 January 1965
Top Secret
Developments over Indonesian Confrontation of Malaysia
On Christmas Eve the British High Commission circulated to the Australian Government copies of an appreciation by the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) outlining Indonesian moves to deploy regular forces in strength on the Borneo border and in Sumatra.1 At the same time British also informed us that the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Begg, was making recommendations to London on the premise that it is militarily unsound, in the face of the increasing threat, to continue a purely defensive policy which would result in a requirement for larger scale reinforcements.
C.-in-C. (Far East) Recommendations
The recommendations by Begg are still being processed with the British Government. They are in three parts—
(a) Recommendations which relate to publicity to be given to the Indonesian build-up and British response. This has been going on during the Christmas period and is continuing. The hope was that it would act as a deterrent on Indonesia. However, since then Indonesia has announced her intention to complete her withdrawal from the United Nations, while her force build-up continues.
(b) Begg asked for immediate reinforcements from outside the theatre and these are being given.
(c) Begg has requested that authority be given for a British policy of deniable hot pursuit up to five miles into Indonesian Borneo territory instead of the present 3,000 yards. (Begg, on the side, has let it be known that he is not attracted to retaliatory action by air-to-ground rocket attack against the island bases of the infiltrators in the Malacca Straits.) There will be a discussion in London on January 12th between Begg and the British Government on these matters. Mr. Wilson, in response to a message from the Tunku for more positive action on the Borneo border, has informed the Tunku that the Commander-in-Chief will go to London to discuss the problem personally with the British Chiefs of Staff on January 12th.
View of Australian Intelligence Authorities
The Australian Intelligence authorities support the main British findings on build-up. The indications are that the build-up will continue through January for an effort to secure a limited Indonesian position in Malaysian Borneo territory during February.
Additional Australian Troops?
There have been no requests from the British Government for additional Australian troops in the Malaysian area although such a request might well arise.
Withdrawal of Indonesia from the United Nations
There is no firm assessment as to how Indonesia will use her withdrawal from the United Nations in pursuit of these objectives. In this Department we think several things can be reasonably inferred.
(a) Indonesia has freed herself from orthodox international restraints.
(b) The timing of the moves could allow Indonesia, with the support of China, to make a major case in support of her objectives at the Afro-Asian Conference to be held in Algiers in March, where the host Government is believed to be sympathetic with Indonesian objectives.
(c) Although the agreement on West Irian is formally between the Dutch and the Indonesians, the Agreement called for the United Nations to supervise a plebiscite in West Irian.2 This could now go out the window.
(d) Indonesia is less inhibited in making use of pretexts against Australia, e.g. for forays across the border of Papua New Guinea. There is, however, no sign that this is contemplated.
[NAA: A1209, 1964/6647 part 4]
1 JIC(FE) reported that two Indonesian brigades and a light armed police brigade were building-up in western Sarawak, and possibly a brigade of two battalions in Sabah; that possibly two brigades were moving into Sumatra; and that approximately 900 men had been concentrated in the Riau and Sumatran bases for raids into Singapore and Malaya. JIC(FE) assessed that these Indonesian deployments posed the most serious military threat to date.
2 Under the terms of the Netherlands-Indonesian Agreement of 15 August 1962, an act of self-determination was to take place in West Irian in 1969 (see footnote 6, Document 85).