Kuala Lumpur, 21 February 1965
447. Top Secret Austeo Priority
As Pritchett has pointed out, proposals have been modified and it is now intended that Singapore remain in the Federal Parliament speaking only on defence, foreign affairs and possibly internal security. The suggestion here is that the P.A.P. should be represented in the Federal Parliament from a Singapore electoral college and not by direct election.
2. With the P.A.P. in the Federal Parliament, Ismail is anxious that the Central Government should not (repeat not) give up control of internal security in Singapore. He has been encouraged by a report that Mountbatten told Lee that the British would be unhappy about their military commitment in Singapore unless the Central Government retained control of internal security. Ismail also thinks in the final analysis Lee would like to be able to avoid responsibility for arrests in Singapore to preserve national security. If the P.A.P. insists on controlling the Singapore police, Ismail is thinking of creating a special municipal police to deal with such matters as traffic, control of hawkers, local offences, etc., in Singapore.
3. The following are comments on the issues raised in your telegram 276.1
(a) There is no disposition in Kuala Lumpur to rush into new arrangements but rather an understanding that much time and detailed consideration will be needed. Razak, for example, now seems to prefer to postpone decisions until next year if possible. You will also notice from the recent modifications that there is little rigidity in the Malayan thinking at this stage.
(b) As outlined in my telegram 446,2 the main objective of the plan is a disengagement of the P.A.P. and the Alliance in the hope that eventually a better climate will be created for melding Singapore and Malayan politics. Like Lee, the Malayan leaders believe there is no alternative to this disengagement. Pritchett in his 170,3 has explained Lee’s objective. I would only add that Lee may also see advantage in combining a common market with some financial autonomy. At least he should be in a strong bargaining position in the financial talks. I understand he has already had some indication that the Tunku would be generous. Other arguments influencing the Malayans are:
(i) The need for the Tunku (and with an eye to the future, to some extent Razak) to assume a stature above communal party politics.
(ii) The need to disengage as far as practicable Lee Kuan Yew and Tan Siew Sin.
(iii) As a minor consideration, it is hoped that protracted negotiations over the new arrangements will prove a helpful diversion for Lee Kuan Yew’s restless energies.
(c) Provided they are carefully handled and presented, I believe that the proposed changes can be effected without widespread political controversy, but I agree with Lee that it is important to avoid premature disclosure. Since Singapore will continue to be represented in the Federal Parliament, the Alliance parties will presumably continue to function in Singapore and this should help to reduce any reaction from the Singapore Malays. Nevertheless, these Malays pose a problem and their reaction could encourage unwise interference by the Central Government in Singapore.
(d) As modified, I would not expect the proposed changes to lead to feeling of uncertainty or open the way for agitation for a further change. In practice, the only important constitutional change may be to give Singapore autonomy in finance. This is not a responsibility which either Sarawak or Sabah would want to assume since one of the main attractions of Malaysia is the financial support they can expect from the Central Government for economic development. S.U.P.P.’s continuing campaign for independence is unlikely to be strengthened appreciably. Nor do I expect the Borneo states to be concerned about the new basis of Singapore’s representation in the Central Legislature.
4. Careful presentation as Lee has suggested could greatly reduce the risks of international repercussions. Indeed, if an effective disengagement can be achieved, it should be possible to promote greater international confidence in Malaysia’s future.
5. The big question mark is whether Lee and the P.A.P. will be able to ‘withdraw altogether from Malaya’ and to restrain themselves in the Federal Parliament on issues like Malay privileges and the national language.
[NAA: A11536, 18]
1 Document 246.
2 Document 248.
3 Document 247.