Canberra, 24 February 1965
308. 202. Top Secret
Exchanges between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore.
In addition to your reports we have had a British account of the sequence of the exchanges between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. We have also seen the instructions which have gone to Lord Head and I have been asked by the British High Commissioner whether I would instruct you to support the position Lord Head is instructed to take.1 I informed Oliver today that my instructions would reflect a similar view.
2. I also told Oliver that in my view the Malaysian intention to enter into discussions with Indonesia in Bangkok was of great relevance. I said that the Tunku and his Ministers could not undertake the two matters at the same time. In saying this I had in mind not merely the practical problems of conducting the two negotiations at the same time but, also, the need for Malaysia to present a solid and united front when engaged in talks with the Indonesians. Malaysia’s display of national firmness and cohesion had been an important asset in previous meetings with the Indonesians. But the situation would be precarious and possibly dangerous if Malaysia was attempting to convince Indonesia at the conference table of its invulnerability to pressures while, at the same time, there was open evidence of disharmony and political controversy between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur with likely repercussions in the two Borneo states.
3. I believe these considerations should be your starting point in discussions which I wish you to have with the Tunku. As stated in my previous telegram2 we must concern ourselves directly with this problem of relations between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. We have a lively and immediate concern with the integrity of Malaysia both in fact and in international appearance.
4. We would expect the Malaysian leaders both in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore to be extremely cautious about precipitating serious constitutional issues, with all the political complications that they involve, at the present time of national danger. The prospective improvement must be substantial or the present difficulties intolerable before such a course would be justified. The present series of exchanges does not give us confidence that matters are being approached in this spirit. In particular, I have noted with great concern the Tunku’s first suggestion that Singapore should surrender all 15 seats in the Federal Parliament and that all powers except defence and external affairs, including internal security, become the responsibility of Singapore.3 This would be a radical departure from the basic concept of Malaysia and would not really solve but pose anew the fundamental problem of the future of Singapore. It would further weaken the prospects of true federalism. That the Tunku should be thinking in such apparently loose terms makes it the more important for you to remain in close and influential contact with him.
5. We also note that the Tunku shows no evident concern about the possible repercussions in Sabah and Sarawak. It seems to me that we must reckon on possible adverse effects in Sabah and Sarawak where there is a good deal of political friction and rivalry which could be further aggravated. I note that Lee himself has expressed the view to the British that Sabah and Sarawak would inevitably ask for similar arrangements.
6. In your talks with the Tunku and his colleagues you should seek to bring them back to the fundamental principles upon which Malaysia was established. A genuine multi-racial Malaysia should remain the goal subject to the necessary safeguards and balances required in such a complex grouping. Singapore should be involved as much as practicable in the common political and constitutional framework of Malaysia in order that it be firmly anchored. A major ‘disengagement’ could lead to a self-governing island state in what amounts to a treaty relationship with the rest of Malaysia for economic, defence and external affairs purposes. The danger of this is that, under a radical or chauvinistic government, the federal powers could be frustrated and the problems which we have always associated with an independent Chinese state in Singapore could re-emerge.
7. The retention of federal power for internal security is in our view of key importance. The need to deter unconstitutional challenges to the Singapore Government; to ensure that the defence base establishments can be worked in times of crisis; and the need to retain foreign economic confidence in Singapore all make it essential for the Central Government to maintain its strong powers for internal security. Federal Ministers should not lose sight of the original bargain that Singapore would gain the great advantages of economic freedom and a common market throughout Malaysia in return for accepting internal security and law and order as federal responsibilities.
8. In stating that these comer stones of Malaysia should not be disturbed, you should be careful not to leave any impression that we believe that the Kuala Lumpur and Singapore leaders must accommodate themselves to the existing constitutional framework for an indefinite period. Given the circumstances of the formation of Malaysia this could give rise to resentment for both ourselves and Britain. Over and above this, however, you should make it clear that we fully recognise that the present political arrangements between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur are not working satisfactorily and cause serious problems in both capitals. We fully appreciate the need for a process of adjustment and the working out in practice of a political relationship which reflects the domestic interests and problems of the two Governments.
9. Our concerns are that essential concepts of Malaysia should be preserved; that inadvertently a process of disintegration should not be started; and that Indonesia should not be encouraged that ‘confrontation’ is working.
10. Please work out with Pritchett which of these points he should put to Lee.
[NAA: A11537, 14]
1 Not located. It is presumed that Head’s instructions were that the UK Government opposed Singapore-Kuala Lumpur disengagement (see Documents 297 and 306).
2 Document 246.
3 See Documents 244 and 247.