Canberra, 1 March 1965
350. Secret
Your telegram No. 523.1
We feel some misgivings at the possibility that the Tunku himself will go to Bangkok for direct talks with Sukarno. We think it probable that this new approach from Indonesia represents a calculated judgment that the Tunku is likely to be less cautious and more optimistic than Razak and that he might enter into on the spot commitments as he did in the meetings in Tokyo last year.2 We are also concerned that the Malaysians appear not to be insisting that there should be a significant period free from incursions before talking of any kind takes place. It seems to us that failure to insist on this requirement will make it more difficult for the Malaysians in future to sustain the principle that all acts of hostility must cease before there are substantive discussions, whether directly or through an Afro-Asian committee.
2. If the Tunku has already agreed to the new approaches there is not much you can do, but if he has not made up his mind, or if there are second thoughts brought about by evidence of Indonesian bad faith, you may be able to exercise a useful influence.
3. It seems to us preferable that the initial talks in Bangkok should be purely of an exploratory character between Razak and Subandrio in which the Malaysians would not enter into commitments. We would envisage listening to what Subandrio has to say and forming a judgment about the usefulness of further talks either at the ministerial or ‘summit’ level. It might also be desirable for Razak to insist in these preliminary talks that before substantive discussion could be begun there must be a significant period free from incursions.
[NAA: A2908, M l20 part 4]
1 28 February. It advised that the Indonesians had now suggested a tripartite summit ‘concurrently with or earlier than’ the proposed ministerial meeting in Bangkok, and that the Malaysians were only prepared to have bilateral talks at both levels ‘any time after 9 March’. It also advised that ‘only the Tunku has shown much enthusiasm for the talks’.
2 See editorial note, 1964 Tripartite Talks.