Kuala Lumpur, 2 March 1965
554. Secret
I went over the arguments in your 523 (322?)1 with the Tunku this morning. Razak was also present. Tunku appreciated the force of these arguments but said there was further background that you should know about
2. Recently there had been a number of approaches from Indonesia. Adam Malik had been endeavouring for some time to establish contact and a further approach was now being made. A group of Army officers were coming from Hong Kong and had already indicated that they wanted the conflict to be resolved in terms of a new federation for Indonesia.
3. More particularly, Syed Nasir2 had received a call saying Tunku Osman who had worked in the Indonesian Embassy here3 wanted him to go to Bangkok for an important message. In Bangkok Syed Nasir had met a Major Said4 who had been a member of the self-styled ‘Army brains trust’ which included Jani and Sukendro.5 They had left Said behind in Bangkok to make overtures to Malaysia.
4. Major Said told Nasir that the Army were worried about the growing strength of the Communists. The Army and Navy were sound but the Air Force was heavily infiltrated. The Army was now anxious to come to terms with Malaysia. Orders for incursions into Malaysia had never been given by the Army but by Subandrio. Subandrio had been found guilty of forging communications and as a consequence was now out of favour with Sukarno. Nasir had been assured that Indonesia would stop hostilities against Malaysia from the 5th March for at least three weeks and preferably for as long as possible.
5.
Tunku thought Nasir’s report from the Army sources tied in with the information he had been given by Thanat. Thanat had said Subandrio seemed a very worried man. He had also passed to the Tunku, when he met him last week a message from Subandrio, which included the following operative section—
‘After a long discussion with President Sukarno, we came to the following conclusions:—
(a) The political atmosphere between the two countries and especially between President Sukarno and Tunku Abdul Rahman is certainly not conducive to instruct ministerial delegations for an amenable approach, in other words, a ministerial delegation will have no margin to manoeuvre for the time being.
(b) President Sukarno proposed to have a summit meeting between the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia in order to create a climate of rapprochement between the three Heads, even if they are not discussing substance of the problem.
(c) In this atmosphere of rapprochement between the three Heads, Ministers can go on to tackle the problem stage by stage, either at that time or at another occasion.
What is very much emphasised is the atmosphere of rapprochement of the three Heads and this will stimulate public opinion for the attitude of give and take. I sincerely hope you can give full consideration to this thought.’
6. Tunku, who believed Sukarno wanted top level talks because he mistrusted Subandrio, had replied through Thanat as follows—
(a) He is agreeable to meeting Sukarno in Bangkok at any time but preferably after the 10th March.
(b) He agrees with Subandrio’s previous suggestion that the meeting should be confined to Indonesia and Malaysia because the issue involved concerns only the two countries.
(c) He is agreeable to Ministerial meetings while the two Heads are present in Bangkok for the talks.
(d) If Macapagal wished, he would be prepared to talk to him separately about the Sabah claim.6
7. Major Said on behalf of the Indonesian Army officers had emphasised Sukarno’s vanity and the importance of finding some face-saving device. Thanat had suggested a possible reascertainment but the Tunku had rejected this. The only face-saving device he could agree to would be an Afro-Asian Commission whose members must recognise Malaysia as a sovereign and independent country. He had also emphasised that it would have to be given specific terms of reference and that these should be based on the formula agreed in Tokyo, i.e. ‘t of ind ways and means of normalising relations’ between the countries.7
8. Tunku commented that as the aggrieved party there was no need for Malaysia to make concessions. By accepting an Afro-Asian Commission to ‘delve into Malaysia’s internal affairs’ he would be making a big concession to Indonesia. When I queried the phrase ‘delve into internal affairs’ Tunku agreed that this was not what he meant and that he had no intention of compromising Malaysian sovereignty.
9. Tunku said the foregoing ideas on how a settlement might be reached had been passed on to Sukarno by Thanat and he was now awaiting Indonesia’s reaction. I mentioned that Malaysia could also offer the return of large numbers of Indonesian prisoners. The Tunku laughed and said, ‘I would be happy to hand them back but I am not sure that he wants them’.
10. Tunku said he was not deceiving himself that the talks would succeed but he felt confident about Malaysia’s position which had been greatly strengthened with the Afro-Asians by Indonesia leaving the United Nations. He wanted t of urther strengthen it. Sukarno was also anxious to play up to the Afro-Asians and would be able to take advantage of a refusal to talk. After Indonesia had replied he would discuss the proposed talks with his Cabinet and promised to keep the British, New Zealanders and ourselves fully informed. The British Prime Minister had sent a personal message saying he was happy the meeting was taking place. He hoped it succeeded, but if it failed, the Tunku could rest assured of British support.
11. I have not yet had an opportunity to discuss your 3088 with Tunku but have arranged to see him again tomorrow.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/11/51 part 1]
1 Queried number is correct (Document 252).
2 Syed Nasir bin Ismail, Director of the Language and Literature Institute. A prominent Malaysian Malay language educationalist who had worked with the Indonesians in standardising spelling between Bahasa Indonesia and Bahasa Melayu.
3 Presumably, this refers to Syed Nasir and not Tunku Osman, a professional soldier who had not served on a diplomatic posting.
4 Possibly, Major Ali Said, an Indonesian Army military lawyer.
5 Brigadier General Sukendro, Minister for Komcmdo Operasi Tertinggi (KOTI – Indonesia’s Supreme Operational Command).
6 See footnote 2, Document 17.
7 See editorial note, 1964 Tripartite Talks.
8 Document 251.