Kuala Lumpur, 3 March 1965
569. Top Secret Priority
I spoke to the Tunku this morning along the lines of your 308.1 He quickly made it clear that the situation had changed and that there was no present prospect of a disengagement with Singapore.
2. Tunku said he had intended to work out quietly with Lee a readjustment that might reduce the tensions and communal feelings that were threatening Malaysia. He knew that Lee was anxious to control his own taxation and he thought that this might have provided a basis for disengagement if Singapore had been agreeable to contributing to the development of Malaysia as a whole.
3. Lee, however, had ‘over-played his hand’. In trying to rush through an agreement he was endeavouring to bring all sorts of pressures to bear. These included deliberate efforts to emphasise communal issues and create an atmosphere of crisis.2 He was also trying to induce the British and others to intervene in his interests. In these circumstances, it was impossible to work with Lee and he (Tunku) was now refusing to talk with him.
4. Head spoke to Wade and me this morning of his concern about Lee’s present tactics and the dangerous repercussions they could have on communal feeling and on international confidence in Malaysia. Head agreed that there could be an element of bluff but thought that Lee was showing considerable instability and was capable of pressing his campaign to dangerous lengths.
5. After seeing the Tunku, Head told Lee today that if he wanted a disengagement with Kuala Lumpur he was going about it in entirely the wrong way and could not expect British sympathy. Lee’s retort was that he thought that Head had more intelligence but Head stuck to his guns.
6. Both Head and I believe the answer is a political truce between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur for at least the duration of the emergency created by Indonesian confrontation.Such a truce could provide a cooling off period in which to seek closer co-operation between the two governments. Unfortunately, I see no prospect at present of achieving it. The Tunku might possibly be persuaded, but Lee in his present mood could not.
7. I met Lee yesterday at Parliament House. He spoke in much the same way as Pritchett reported in his 190.3 He was relaxed but eloquent about the urgent need for early disengagement with greater powers for Singapore and was not prepared to consider any alternative. He expressed concern about the proposed talks with Indonesia in Bangkok. Hinting that the Tunku might sell out Malaysia, he wondered whether he could leave the country with so much going on. I tried to reassure him.
[NAA: A9735, TS225/5]
1 Document 251.
2 Lee had been reported as planning to consolidate all the opposition parties in Malaysia against the Alliance.
3 Document 254.