Canberra, 3 March 1965
373. Secret Priority
Talks in Bangkok
Reference your telegram No. 554.1
This account provides useful insight into the Tunku’s thinking but does not alter our assessment of the Indonesian motivation behind the approaches they are making.
2. We accept the view that the Army in Indonesia is concerned at the inherent risks of military operations against Malaysia and is concerned, also, that it may be unable to prevent Indonesian decisions which could heighten the military risks. We also accept the view that the Army is worried about the growth of the influence of the P.K.I.through ‘united front’ tactics which the confrontation policy enables it to exploit fully. But we have no evidence that the Army has determined upon a policy that Indonesia must come to terms with Malaysia. Moreover, even if this were what senior Army commanders would wish to happen we doubt the political capacity of the Army to achieve this result.
3. I agree that the manoeuvres of internal groupings in Indonesia are important but see some risk that the Tunku is again thinking that confrontation is basically Communistinspired and that his worries would be largely over if the Indonesian Army cracked down on the P.K.I. Do you agree that this tendency to over-simplify the problem is present in the Tunku’s mind?
4. We note that the Indonesian Army officers are reported to be talking of the importance of finding some face-saving device for Sukarno. As I stated in my telegram No. 3222 I think that the Malaysians are deluded if they think that an Afro-Asian Commission will offer Indonesia prospects of face-saving without bringing other risks to Malaysia. I am still concerned at the relationship between the establishment of an Afro-Asian Commission and the issue of a possible re-ascertainment. I note that even Thanat has suggested a possible reascertainment and you report the Tunku as saying that he had rejected it. But I am not sure how far this is a formal expression of policy; whether the Malaysians intend to say firmly in Bangkok that this issue is excluded from the work of the Afro-Asian Commission; and if necessary allow the talks to break down on this question. Is that their policy?
5. You refer to the Tunku saying that the Commission would have to be given specific terms of reference based on the formula ‘t of find ways and means of normalising relations’ between the two countries. However, the communique issued after the Tokyo meeting says that the Commission shall be requested ‘to study the existing problems between the three countries and to submit recommendations for their solution’.3 This form of words seems wider than the formula you have quoted. Would you please clarify? It seems to us likely that, once the Afro-Asian Commission is established, the Indonesians will press for a speedy report and will use their influence for a recommendation in favour of reascertainment. Their tactics might be to say that the Government could ensure the cessation of acts of hostilities for a limited period pending the issue of a report by the Commission, but not indefinitely because of the internal pressures.
6. Your paragraph 9 refers to the Tunku’s ideas on how a settlement might be reached having been passed to Sukarno by Thanat. Can you discover whether these matters have been dealt with in some precision? Does the Tunku’s decision about going to a meeting with Sukarno depend on the Indonesian reaction?
7. I should like you to give some thought to the difficult situation in which Malaysia might find itself in these talks and to give me your own views on the tactics they might follow.
[NAA: A1209, 1964/6715]
1 Document 256.
2 Document 252.
3 See editorial note, 1964 Tripartite Talks.