Kuala Lumpur, 14 April 1965
16 . Secret
Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s Views
Lee, who is making his first visit to Kuala Lumpur since his return from Australia, called on me today. He had not yet seen the Tunku but hoped to do so this evening.
2. Lee complained about the heat in Sydney and Canberra but said Melbourne and Adelaide had been more agreeable. On the whole, his impressions had been reasonably favourable. He summed up Australia as a country ‘on the move’ and likely to follow increasingly the American pattern.
3. Asked about Kuala Lumpur reactions to the visit, I warned him that some of the press reports had aroused resentment and that there was little disposition to listen to explanations. Lee said there had only been two reports to which exception could be taken and that he had lost no time in publicly denying the comments attributed to him. He thought it would probably take some time before the Tunku appreciated that it would not have been in his own interests to have made the alleged comments.1
4. It was clear that Lee’s main concern in visiting me was to speak about the importance of an early disengagement of Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. Otherwise ‘Malaysia would blow up in our faces’. On his return to Singapore, he had found that there was great communal tension and a serious complication was that the Communists had now finally decided, apparently within the last few days, that racial disorders were to their advantage. Lee considered that with the Communists working on the Chinese and with the Indonesians working on the Malays, he and the Tunku were bound to lose out unless they reached an understanding. As Lee saw it, with the Police and Army predominantly Malay,racial disturbances would mean that the Chinese would turn to the Communists, the only people with the arms to protect them.
5. In these circumstances, the only course was for the PAP to withdraw from Malaya and the Alliance from Singapore. This would promote a better climate which would make cooperation and an eventual re-engagement possible. It might be necessary to wait a generation before we would know if Malaysia could succeed but Lee thought that given the proper atmosphere a new situation would be created much faster than people expected, perhaps in five years. He implied that the PAP and the Alliance could then come together in a coalition.
6. Lee spoke in familiar terms about the Tunku and other UMNO leaders being under pressure from the Malay extremists. I agreed that the political competition between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur was producing the wrong atmosphere for the adoption of policies by the Central Government that would knit the accessible non Malays into Malaysia. But I said I thought Lee over-stated the influence of extremist elements. The problem was rather that the present atmosphere was leading to a hardening of Malay opinion generally.
7. Lee considered that the two essentials for disengagement were—
(a) the development of the common market;
(b) Singapore taking responsibility for its own internal security.
8. I agreed on the importance of pushing ahead with the common market not only to promote economic development and prosperity but also to give people an economic stake in Malaysia. On the other hand, I pointed out that there could be complications and international repercussions if the Federation transferred control of internal security and especially while confrontation continued. Lee argued strongly that he had to have internal security to preserve law and order and to deny opportunities to the Communists.
9. I thought that this was an appropriate stage to ask whether Lee had met any criticism in Australia over arrests and detentions in Singapore. He admitted he had saying there was evidence that people in Australia had been kept informed on this subject and that the Barisan Sosialis probably had contacts with Malaysian students and perhaps Trade Unions.2 He had foreseen the criticism and had wanted Devan Nair to accompany him to explain in person why he had been in prison on two occasions.3 This would have been a most effective answer but unfortunately Devan Nair had gone off to India. He still hoped that Devan Nair would shortly be able to lead a mission to Australia. He also hoped that contacts could be maintained and better understanding created with Australian Labor politicians. Unfortunately, he had missed meeting Uren4 recently when he had passed through Singapore.
10. I asked Lee how he thought disengagement would affect Sarawak and Sabah. He said that leaving politics aside the Tunku would be wise while confrontation continued to let these State Governments run their own affairs without interference. No constitutional change was necessary but the Central Government could refrain from vetoing what the State governments wanted to do. As it was, there was much frustration. Donald Stephens, for example had been seeing him and in his present mood could blow things up in Sabah at any time. Even if Stephens did not, other members of the Party might. They were set on elections and had been seeking PAP support to make sure of winning them.5 Lee said he had sent two PAP delegations to Sabah and his assessment, as well as the Central Government’s, was that the PAP could exercise a decisive influence. This was causing a good deal of agitation in Kuala Lumpur and was not helping matters. It was better in all these circumstances for the Borneo States, Singapore and Malaya to settle down quietly by themselves for the time being.
11. I refrained from pointing out to Lee that the prospects of bringing Sabah and Sarawak into a Federal system are probably far brighter while confrontation continues. On the other hand, I agree with him that Kuala Lumpur would be wise to proceed slowly and carefully with policies in Borneo that could appear to have a Malay flavour.
12. Without doubt, a political disengagement of the PAP and the Alliance would be of great benefit to Malaysia at this time. Nevertheless, Lee appears to be deliberately playing up a sense of crisis in an endeavour to achieve disengagement on terms especially favourable to himself and the PAP. These tactics have two unfortunate effects which Lee appears to disregard. Firstly, they are increasing communal tension and are having an unsettling effect especially on the Malays. Secondly, they are undermining international confidence in Malaysia, especially as Lee, in his talks with foreign correspondents, makes no secret of his view that Malaysia could blow up at any time.
[NAA: A 1838, 3027/2/1 part 21]
1 On 17 March, the Sydney Daily Mirror had published a story under the headline ‘Malaysian Dissension— Australia warned by Lee’ that purported to be an account of Lee’s talks with Menzies. Inter alia, the report said that the Tunku ‘was losing control of day-to-day government’ and that Lee was ‘privately urging Australian leaders that they give support to Malaysia as a country, not to the regime in Kuala Lumpur’. DEA advised Critchley on 18 March that Lee had been ‘angered’ by the report and instructed his press officer to prevent agencies carrying the story outside Australia ‘on grounds that it is inaccurate’. Critchley was also advised that the story had been ‘based on exaggeration of some general points’ contained in a confidential background briefing given to the reporter by Lee’s press officer.
2 See Document 9 and footnote 14, Document 29.
3 C.V. Devan Nair was first detained in 1951 under the laws for detention without trial imposed during the Emergency. At the time he was a member of the underground communist front known as the Anti-British League, and a leading official of the Singapore Teachers’ Union. Following his release in 1953, while continuing to work for the Communist Party, he became associated with the PAP. As a member of the Middle Road Group, Nair was detained again 1956-59 following union and PAP support given to the October 1956 student riots. In the 1964 Malaysian election, Nair was the only PAP candidate to win a seat.
4 Tom Uren, an Australian Labor Party back bencher in the House of Representatives, who had been prisoner of war of the Japanese on the Burma railroad and in Changi 1942-15.
5 As in Singapore, there was increasing dissatisfaction in Sabah and Sarawak, particularly among the indigeneous groups, against the Malay-dominated Central Government. Donald Stephens, Minister of Sabah Affairs and Civil Defence, championed the cause of the numerically dominant Kadazandusuns of the state and sought to merge his United Pasok Kadazan Organization (UPKO) with the PAP in order to gain the Chinese vote in the 1967 state election, thus ensuring a majority in the Sabah State Assembly.