Singapore, 26 June 1965
544 . Secret Immediate
Canberra’s 679.1
As reported by the High Commissioner (his 6 to London)2 the political situation has been comparatively subdued over the last two weeks. The main development in Singapore/ Kuala Lumpur relations has been the Tunku’s statement that he was ready to talk with Lee (made, however, just as he was leaving the country for London) and the increasing prospect that Lee and Razak would meet, which Razak has now told the press will take place on June 29. Lee has continued to protest at U.M.N.O. communal agitation among the Malays, but can presumably expect little change from Razak on this, who will say Lee himself is provoking it. Lee for his part is convinced that Razak is largely committed, even if mainly out of regard for his own political position, to maintain Malay ascendency and that the opposition in3 the U.M.N.O. express to talks reflects Razak’s attitude.
2. The RA P. takes some credit for the recent emphasis by the Central Government on development, believing that this has been stimulated by its criticisms. But it can be getting little comfort from reports from Sarawak that S.U.P.P.’s participation in Lee’s Malaysian Malaysia Solidarity Front is under attack from S.U.P.P.’s left-wing, opposed to both Malaysia and to Lee. Without S.U.P.P. the front will be merely the P.A.P. and a few minor politicians from Malaya. Lee is addressing two P A R meetings in Malaya this weekend which might give some indication of how he envisages developing his position, and of the support he commands in Malaya.
3. I have not seen4 mentioned by the High Commissioner of Lee’s continued interest in partition. I do not believe this a current objective nor do I believe he is in any position to threaten it as a short-term tactic or that he is doing so. Certainly Lee sees some arrangement such as maximum independence for Singapore or partition as final possibilities in his view of the way Malaysia is now developing, and says so, foolishly enough: but I feel we should not interpret all his actions in this light. I find it disturbing that the Central Government should be contemplating solving its difficulties with Lee by suppressive measures. Lee’s belligerence to an important extent derives from anxiety about this.
4. I have had no opportunity yet to speak with Lee himself directly about his attitude to Australia, referred to by the High Commissioner. However, it does seem that he recently concluded that the Australian Government had decided to back the Tunku rather than him. As far as I can gather, the considerations moving him do not stand up and I should not expect difficulty in correcting him. My information is that his irritation and uncertainty were temporary. However, he could also be moved by disappointment in respect of the circumstances I discussed with you when you passed through en route to London for the 5.E.A.T.O. Conference.5
[NAA: A1838, 3027/2/1 part 23]
1 See footnote 2, Document 278.
2 Document 278.
3 Possibly,‘that’.
4 Three or four words expunged.
5 See footnote 1, Document 267.