Jakarta, 9 August 1965
935. Secret Immediate
Singapore and Indonesia
We have heard on Radio Australia that Singapore is no longer part of Malaysia. The British Ambassador earlier in the morning informed me of the immediate background in Kuala Lumpur to this announcement. Already there has been some lower level Foreign Office reaction from Harsono, and the triumphant tone of it was entirely predictable. It has been carried in full on the wire services. Without exception and led by Sukarno and Subandrio, we will hear endless gloatings and self-congratulations about the triumph of Indonesian foreign policy larded with the usual things of how time and the irreversible political forces in today’s world are on the side of the New Emerging Forces. We have already been told that we must understand our mistakes, admit the correctness of Indonesian policy, and understand that neither we nor the United Nations can impose artificial solutions on Asia.
2. One of the more regrettable effects will be to strengthen immeasurably Subandrio’s position and the influence of the P.K.I. Whether or not the rumours we have been hearing lately about Sukarno being disenchanted with the results of Subandrio’s policy over Malaysia and the Afro-Asian Conference are true, no longer matter. Subandrio will now be able to claim that his policy of a strong line against the Federation has caused a serious and irreparable blow to the Western military and political position in South-East Asia.What is more, he will argue this is only the beginning. We can also assume that Subandrio aided by the P.K.I. will do this with such skill and ruthlessness that it will be yet another discouragement to the few who have had the courage, from time to time, to advocate moderation in Indonesia’s confrontation against Malaysia. All of those who wanted a negotiated settlement of confrontation are demonstrably ‘wrong’.
3. Another immediate effect will probably be to divert attention from some of the critical internal developments, such as the campaign against the Americans and the rapidly spiralling inflation. In this moment of triumph left-wing pressures on both these fronts might conceivably ease. Happening a week before Sukarno’s August 17th speech commemorating the 20th Anniversary of Independence it will give him a timely opportunity to boast about success and inevitability of his so-called Indonesian Revolution. Rather paradoxically, it might mean that he will be more relaxed and conceivably tone down some of the things he might otherwise have said or done on this occasion. However, in the longer run (and that could be only a matter of weeks after the 17th August) this breach in the Malaysian Federation is one which can only encourage the intransigence and misbehaviour of Sukarno, Subandrio, the P.K.I. and all those who run with them.
4. What the Indonesians will do about Singapore is a pretty question. Despite their claims that they accepted the separate parts of the Federation as independent, I suspect that they will forget this and go on with at least an economic confrontation of Singapore. But this is something that may not be clarified for a while. The Indonesians can afford to take their time.
5. I confess to being a bit gloomy. The Indonesians will rub my nose in arguments advanced now for over two years about viability, United Nations assessments, people having no right to interfere with a recognised entity and so on. I expect Subandrio to be peculiarly offensive. And I am even more horrified than usual about the prospects of ever persuading Indonesia to be a reasonable and sensible neighbour. Sukarno should make the Tunku a member of his Cabinet. He could hardly have done us a greater disservice.
[NAA: A6364, JA1965/07]