Kuala Lumpur, 9 August 1965
1729 . Secret Immediate
Separation of Singapore
I shall report more fully as further information becomes available but the following are my first reactions to the questions raised in your telegram 1148.1
(a) Lee Kuan Yew was a willing participant but only it seems under pressure from Goh Keng Swee and Barker2 in Singapore. Both threatened to resign if Lee did not accept the proposals. Main architects of the agreement were Razak and Ismail from Kuala Lumpur and Goh Keng Swee and Barker from Singapore. Goh Keng Swee appears to have played a decisive role. According to Ismail, Lee was not prepared for a showdown with Goh who argued that recent trends had to be stopped and that the only hope for the future lay in disengagement now and the establishment of a better basis for co-operation. Devan Nair’s speech in Parliament this morning (my 1721)3 suggests that the RA.R may claim that they were forced out of Malaysia because they would not accept any watering down of their goal of a genuine Malaysian Malaysia, but I doubt if this will be the official RA.R reaction in Singapore. Secrecy which was remarkably well kept was, according to Ismail, at Singapore’s insistence. Even Fenner did not know about the decision until this morning. Head appears to have been angry about the lack of consultation and to have claimed that it may cost him his post but present Malaysian attitude is to accept the blame. Strongest opposition to the proposals came from Rajaratnam and Toh Chin Chye but in the end Toh appears to have accepted the agreement with good grace and to be respected by Razak and Ismail.
(b) I believe Tunku sincerely wants co-operation with Singapore and that this was the motivation of Goh, Barker, Razak and Ismail. Whether such co-operation will eventuate is the big question-mark but I am now more hopeful than at any time since Malaysia. It is in any case difficult to imagine less co-operation than has existed in recent months. The allocation of portfolios in Singapore is most important and significant. Goh will be responsible for defence and internal security and both Razak and Ismail believe they can work with him. Lim Kim San who will take control of economic affairs is well versed in dealing with Malays and the Tunku has more trust in him than in any other member of the Singapore Government.
(c) There seems no reason to expect Singapore’s resistance to Indonesia’s confrontation to diminish in any way and indeed Lee has already reaffirmed his Government’s policy on this.
(d) Communal pressures have recently become serious and even well educated and intelligent young Malays and Chinese have been adopting positions based more on emotion than logic. I shall elaborate by memorandum.4 The moderate leaders in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur were convinced that the trend had to be arrested and that only drastic measures would suffice. Malay leaders are in firm control of the party. As you will notice from my telegram 17245 the decision to separate Singapore was vigorously but unsuccessfully opposed by Ja’afar Albar and Syed Nasir both of whom are regarded by the RA.R as extremists. Ja’afar Albar absented himself from the voting on the bill. I have the impression that there is a move to get rid of him as Secretary-General of U.M.N.O. and that this post may be given to Khir Johari who acted as chief whip today. The Tunku’s own position remains very strong and he will continue to have the key voice in Alliance policy. The final decision was essentially the Tunku’s and he told me that he had been keeping in touch with Razak in recent weeks. The main Alliance motive in detaching Singapore is to halt and if possible reverse the trend towards increasing communal divisions inside Malaysia. Alliance leaders this evening are confident and relaxed. I would not expect the Chinese t of eel threatened but there is no doubt that Lee has been exercising an increasing influence on the Chinese and particularly on the young educated non-Malays. They will resent Singapore’s separation and see it as a set-back to non-Malay interests especially in the political field. I suspect they will exercise a strong appeal for Lee to intervene in politics in Malaya and the Borneo States but I doubt if Lee will have as free a hand in future as he has had in the past.
(e) It is too early to report the reactions in Northern Borneo or look for signs that Indonesia is beginning to exploit the partial break-up of the Federation. Government leaders in Sarawak and Sabah are understandably anxious about the situation but as reported in my telegram 1724 they have been consulted in advance (albeit at the death knock) and they have concurred with the decision. Razak and Ismail have praised the attitudes of Peter Lo, Stephens and Temenggong Jugah.6 Tonight, Jugah issued a public statement to the effect that Sarawak would never leave Malaysia.
(f) I believe we should give careful legal consideration to the defence arrangements as agreed between Singapore and the Central Government. While both Governments wish to maintain the status quo as expressed in the act and while I would not expect any serious problems in the near future, there will be a number of loose ends to tie up and presumably there will be a need for new legal arrangements with the Government of Singapore.
(g) I strongly recommend an early decision to recognise Singapore and establish appropriate diplomatic accreditation. Pritchett could discuss with Singapore Government appropriate title for Head of Mission leaving question of Commonwealth relationship to be settled in due course. Lee claimed this morning that Tunku would propose Singapore as member of Commonwealth to other members. There is no evidence yet that he has done so. Pakistan is interested in dual accreditation and Wade has recommended this as best means for fulfilling his defence responsibilities. Head expects to have dual accreditation in first instance but British assume that separate representation will be established shortly.
2. Irrespective of the merits of the foregoing analysis our only constructive policy at this stage is to come out solidly in support of the new arrangement and help as far as possible to create an atmosphere of confidence and optimism. I would hope that a very early statement could be made on this basis and that I could be given authority to speak encouragingly of the new arrangements. There is now an opportunity (which may or may not be taken) to start afresh and work out slowly and carefully a basis for co-operation that will make more sense than the hurriedly devised arrangements made in London in 1963.
[NAA: A1838, TS682/21/1 part 15]
1 Document 294.
2 Eddie Barker, Singaporean Minister for Law.
3 9 August, providing a summary of the main statements in the Malaysian Parliament following the Tunku’s speech that morning: Lim Chong Eu (UDP) and Ong Kee Hui (SUPP) both had spoken against the speed with which the separation bill was being enacted; Tan Siew Sin (UMNO) had supported the action as the only way to prevent inevitable racial violence; and Devan Nair (PAP) had claimed that Singapore was being ejected because it adhered to the idea of a Malaysian Malaysia—a concept that had momentum and would succee—and that only the communists would benefit from the separation. The PMIP leader had considered the step appropriate.
4 13 August. Not published.
5 9 August, advising that the third reading of the separation bill had been completed and that the bill was being considered by the Senate so as to become operative that day. It also advised that UMNO members, Ja’afar Albar, Syed Nasir, and Abdul Rahman Talib (former Minister of Education), had opposed the proposal; that Ghazali did not think the separation would solve the problems; and that Peter Lo (Chief Minister of Sabah) and Stephens ‘had anxiously and deeply pondered the problem and had decided that there was no alternative’. Sarawak’s position was less clear.
6 Malaysian Minister of Sarawak Affairs.