Singapore, 10 August 1965
678. Secret Priority
Kuala Lumpur’s 1729.1
2. Position as reported by High Commissioner is not altogether as I understand it here. I do not believe that Goh and Barker threatened resignation: neither have sufficient following in the party or the constituencies for such a threat to carry weight and Lee could easily have handled it with the support of his other colleagues. I was able discreetly to check with Barker and he unhesitatingly denied the report. Barker has only a junior position and was brought into the dealings with Kuala Lumpur purely as a lawyer: he was in no way an ‘architect’ of the arrangements. The first he knew of them was on last Friday (August 6th). He said the Malays were bursting to get the arrangements signed and were cursing the British (who had earlier denied them disengagement)2 and declaring that they had no intention of telling them anything beforehand.
3. I think it more likely that Goh knew of the Malays’ intentions. Razak possibly told him when he visited Kuala Lumpur three weeks ago (see my 583)3 or during Razak’s visit to Singapore two weeks ago.4 As you know he has been a strong advocate of disengagement (though as a basis to press ahead with the common market). But I should think he would have been surprised that the Malays sought Singapore’s complete separation. I doubt he would have welcomed this, if only because of the complication of the economic position. On the other hand, he has said before, and repeated to me only last Wednesday (August 4th), that Singapore might just as well be out of Malaysia if Kuala Lumpur was not going to co-operate economically. Goh has never been enthusiastic about the P.A.P.’s intervention in Malaya and believed Singapore should concentrate first on its own growth. He therefore would not have had Toh’s or Rajaratnam’s motives for opposing separation and I can well believe that, faced with the Malays’ determination, he pressed Lee to accept rather than fight. Lee himself, according to Barker, could not accept separation and sought to talk alternative arrangements with the Tunku when they met on Saturday (which is pretty much how Lee described events in his press interview).
4. Though both Lee and Goh sought disengagement, I doubt that either contemplated a complete break or was an architect of the present arrangement (except in the sense that confronted with the decision to partition they agreed on the terms and instruments). The initiative has been with the Malays since Razak first mooted a looser Federation last December and the Tunku later proposed to Lee Singapore’s removal from the Federal Parliament. Barker said that when he spoke with Razak (an old school friend) on 28th June, Razak complained at length about Lee and then mentioned separation. Barker did not at that time take him seriously and Razak did not pursue the point but said that relations between Malaya and Singapore might need revision after confrontation. However, clearly, the Malays did not drop the idea.
5. I share the High Commissioner’s hopes about future co-operation between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, but am not too optimistic. There is bitterness here and anger at what is seen as a desperate attempt by the Malays to protect themselves from criticism and opposition. In economic affairs particularly, there is much distrust of Tan Siew Sin. Singaporeans have never had much regard for the good sense and capacity of the Alliance Government and their scorn and impatience will be under less restraint. We must also ask to what extent the separation of Singapore will in fact insulate Malayan politics from Singapore’s influence—and to what extent Malay extremists will now be content to let Singapore be. I fully agree every encouragement must be given to co-operation between the two capitals, but in Singapore we shall need to handle this with care and discrimination and avoid stressing the obvious.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/10/4 part 4]
1 Document 295.
2 See footnote 1, Document 251.
3 9 July. It dealt with the Singaporean leadership’s criticism of Josey’s expulsion (see footnote 2, Document 285) and its warning to the Central Government not to attempt similar action against Lee Kuan Yew. It also reported a discussion on the situation between Goh and Pritchett in which Goh advised that he would visit Kuala Lumpur ‘next week’ for talks.
4 24–27 July, during which Razak’s only public engagements had been several university lectures.