Canberra, 11 August 1965
4149. Secret Immediate
Singapore and Malaysia
Following for your information is a copy of a message from the Prime Minister to MrWilson which has been handed to the British High Commission here tonight.
Begins:
We have each been shabbily treated over the way in which the separation of Singapore from Malaysia was arrived at without consultation with us. It is not easy to comprehend this lack of consultation, and even of advance notice. I sent, as you did, a message to the Tunku in somewhat forceful terms in the hope that he might be brought to a postponement.
However, all this has happened, and although we both know that there are dangers ahead, it seems to us that you and we and New Zealand (and, I would hope, the United States) must concentrate on building on the new situation as best we can. This will mean avoiding recrimination and encouraging the two parties to work in close association with each other on the new terms, in the light of their common interests and common dangers. We will immediately recognize Singapore, as I understand you have already done and as New Zealand intends to do. I am sending a message to Lee and another one to the Tunku in which I express goodwill and a confidence in their future.2
Defence is of central importance. We have noted, as you have, that Article 5(i) of the Agreement provides for the establishment of a Joint Defence Council for the purposes of external affairs and mutual assistance. The significance of this, of course, will depend upon what is done under it. But if, in fact, the two parties, being independent of each other, do establish the Council and develop their defence co-operation fully and successfully, I would hope that each of us will feel that our obligations to the area might continue, since, in substance, we would be contributing to the same defence arrangements as before. I realize that there are formal and practical details about defence to be worked out by your people, and that they are already attending to this. But we would certainly wish to be associated with you in our defence contribution, as in the past. In the meantime, we might each be doing whatever we can, firmly if necessary, to induce in both parties a sober and realistic view of their joint need for a unified system of defence. If their own joint arrangements do not prove to be co-operative or satisfactory, then each of us would need to re-consider his position.
There are other matters, for instance in the economic and civil aviation fields, about which we may need to confer in due course. But I leave them for the moment believing that the central thing is to work for as little change as possible in existing defence arrangements. I would be glad of your reaction to this subject.
Ends.
[NAA: A6706, 61]
1 W. Cumming, Official Secretary, High Commission, London.
2 Documents 299 and 300.