Kuala Lumpur, 16 February 1963
121. Secret Immediate
Malaysia–Indonesian Policy
Reference Djakarta’s 158.1
I agree generally with what Shann has said in his first two paragraphs, but I question the prospect of discrediting the Tunku internationally, and dispute that Indonesians are able to discredit him domestically in the foreseeable future. Provided Malaysia goes through,the present Indonesian policy could even have unifying effect of developing support for Malaysia and the Tunku.
2. Although Malaysia involves major problems, it is already far too late for second thoughts about it. In any case, given Britain’s intention of relinquishing sovereignty over Singapore2 I can see no alternative. Because of Indonesian hostility, the sooner it is established the better, and any wavering by the West at this stage would be dangerous.
3. I do not think the Indonesians are bluffing, but even without making allowances for some emotional contents in their statements, they have not gone as far as threatening overt war. I agree with Shann that they would want to avoid it. We must, however, expect greatly intensified campaign and be prepared for Indonesia to infiltrate volunteers into Borneo Territories. I do not consider Malaysia as shaky as it may appear from Djakarta, and having regard to Indonesia’s own weak position in Kalimantan,3 I find it difficult to see how Indonesia can succeed in its campaign or put us in a position where initiative would be thrown on us to use force against Indonesia. The British have the capacity to deal with any threat before Malaysia. Subsequently, the absence of any genuine ‘national liberation movement’ in the North Borneo territories, and the growing support that Malaysia should be able to enlist, will make it difficult for the Indonesians to subvert the territory. If Indonesians step up infiltrations and seek to provoke sizeable physical clashes, Malayans should be able to counter successfully by seeking U.N. presence in the area.
4. In my opinion our policy should be based on the following:—
(a) We should react calmly and temperately to Indonesian provocations but proceed as rapidly as possible with formation of Malaysia.
(b) We should avoid if possible any multi-lateral discussions including Indonesia and also any formal U.N. intervention prior to the establishment of Malaysia.
(c) Major effort had been made by Malayans, both through visiting Missions and otherwise to explain Malaysia in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. I have been suggesting this and there has been some response.
(d) British and Malayans should embark on major anti-subversive drive in Borneo territories and particularly Sarawak. This drive would be directed to cleaning up situation and leaving organization to deal with continuing threat.
(e) If, as we must expect, Indonesians continue hostilities after Malaysia, Malayans should seek to bring United Nations presence into area.
[NAA: A1838, 2498/11 part 1]
1 14 February. In paragraphs 1 and 2, Shann reported that there was no suggestion that Indonesia was preparing for war, despite Subandrio’s threat on 12 February that military conflict over Malaysia may be unavoidable. Instead, the Indonesians were hoping to discredit the Tunku, internationally and domestically, through a major propaganda offensive against him so that the formation of Malaysia could be at least deferred. They believed that if this campaign was unsuccessful, they would still have laid sufficient basis from which to bring about the federation’s early disintegration. Later in the cable, Shann claimed that Malaysia rested ‘on shaky foundations’ as a result of British and Malayan errors in presenting the Federation of Malaysia proposals internationally.
2 The review of Singapore’s constitutional position was to occur in 1963.
3 See footnote 3, Document 25.