Jakarta, 28 August 1965
996. Secret
Malaysia
While this is of course a somewhat hazardous exercise it may be worthwhile to speculate a little on Indonesian behaviour at the moment in the light of the new situation and on possible developments in this behaviour. My thoughts are offered by way of supplement to some of the other communications that you have sent to other posts in particular Eastman’s thoughtful telegram which amongst other things canvasses possible Indonesian reactions.1
2. While the Indonesians are, of course, delighted by what has happened it is clear that the word has come down from the top that this delight is to be expressed in muted tones. This is partly a diplomatic tactic and partly because I think it likely the Indonesians have not yet really made up their minds as to what precisely they want to do in the longer term. Their restraint reflects, I think, their confidence that the breaking up of Malaysia will continue without any additional effort and indeed might be delayed by too much Indonesian pushing. This attitude seems to me to reflect diplomatic finesse on the part of the Indonesians and certainly an unusual restraint.
3. Several Ministers including Subandrio, Saleh, Jusuf2 and Seda3 have had things to say about Singapore with the more or less unanimous view being put forward that the clock cannot be turned back so far as Indonesian relations with Singapore are concerned. This, of course, fits in with the current attitude of standing on ones feet in all fields.4 The President, however, has left the door open to a change of policy in his discussions with Kawashima.5 I think the Indonesians are manifestly tom between the practical advantages of [ending] confrontation with Singapore and their unalterable opposition to the presence in Singapore of the British bases.
4. The key to the short term prospects for Indonesian behaviour probably lies in the fact that they will seek to show in a moderate way that leaving Malaysia will bring certain advantages to Singapore and, therefore, if they were to choose to follow the same course, to Sabah and Sarawak. One might, therefore, speculate I think that there could well be less pressure on Singapore in the way of sabotage etc. and perhaps a little more on Sabah and Sarawak in the way of infiltration and attempted subversion.
5. But in the long run I do not anticipate any real movement on the part of the Indonesians to end confrontation against Malaysia. And any plans that we or the British may be making should not I think be based on any such hope even if the Federation should split into all its remaining three parts. The basic objection to the presence as a restraining influence on Indonesian freedom of action of Commonwealth Forces in the Malaysian area will, for the Indonesians, remain.
[NAA: A6364, JA1965/07]
1 Document 303.
2 Possibly, Jusuf Muda Dalam, Minister of the Central Bank; Brigadier General Achmad Jusuf, Minister of Domestic Trade; or Brigadier General Jusuf Amir, Minister of Light Industry.
3 Frans Seda, Minister of Plantations.
4 A reference to Sukarno’s annual Merdeka Day address on 17 August, which had been entitled, ‘Reach to the Stars: A Year of Self-Reliance’.
5 Dr Shojiro Kawashima, Vice President of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party, and Special Envoy of the Japanese Prime Minister, Sato Eisaku, in Japan’s on-going efforts to mediate between Indonesia and Malaysia to resolve the dispute.