Kuala Lumpur, 31 August 1965
1906. Secret Priority
Sabah and Sarawak
Reference your telegram 1259.1
There are strong elements in Sabah and Sarawak that want more than a ‘spinning out of transitional arrangements’. They see Singapore’s separation as both a reason and an opportunity to press for Constitutional revision or at least new and improved special arrangements.
2. Pritchett believes that any Government in the States that does not now take a pretty militant States’ rights line is going to be constantly outbid and its grip is going to be insecure. I would agree that exploitation of the States’ rights theme will be a long lasting source of instability. I expect that the Central Government will be more likely to rely on firmness and pressure than substantive concessions in dealing with it. The Central Government sees the problem as one of integration and Razak is specific in saying that the Central Government cannot afford any further loosening of control.
3. Kuala Lumpur therefore is not likely to be very flexible and is in no mood to consider any constitutional change. People like the Tunku, Razak and Ismail insist that Sabah and Sarawak will not be allowed to secede and that the present Constitution can and must be made to work.
4. The most we can hope for is a sustained political effort to win not only goodwill but recognition of the basic advantages to Borneo of the Malaysian arrangement and the hazards of secession. Unfortunately the Tunku cannot be influenced at present. He sees the problem in the over-simplified terms of the Chinese communists and an ambitious, untrustworthy minority trying to make trouble. He believes that only a firm line will be heeded and that any other policy will encourage opposition. Razak, Ismail and Ghazali are much more aware of the need for re-assurances and a more sympathetic approach to the present transitional arrangements. Ismail, for example, acknowledges the need to go slow on the language problem.2 Fifty territorial chiefs from Sabah and Sarawak were brought into Kuala Lumpur for the Merdeka celebrations and Razak is giving them special attention.3 Ghazali is now in Sabah and Razak will be going to both Borneo States next week.
5. On the basis of current reports it is difficult to be optimistic and a continuation of uncertainties and political tensions in Borneo must be expected. However firmness on the part of the Central Government coupled with understanding of Borneo’s problems especially in the field of economic development may yet succeed in stabilising the situation. Confrontation may also help.
6. In Sabah, I expect a re-grouping of political parties. Mustapha4 who has just returned to Jesselton will probably resign as Governor and be appointed Minster for Sabah Affairs in the Central Government. He would then spend most of his time in Sabah and would try to take an increasingly active part in politics. It seems likely that the rivalry between Mustapha and Stephens will intensify.
7. In Sarawak, the Alliance leaders will try to keep the Government parties together but unless SUPP runs into trouble (it could, for example, be proscribed), the Government will continue to be shaky and there will remain possibilities but not probabilities of disintegration.
8. Probably both States see their own best future in at least a readjustment and preferably a looser arrangement but I doubt if much thought has been given to the matters raised in your paragraph 5. In any case I would agree that any move for re-adjustment will bring reactions from the Borneo parties in sympathy with the Central Government. Talk of secession in Sabah and Sarawak could be more a threat than a genuine objective. But there seems to be a good deal of loose thinking about the possibilities of Sabah and Sarawak successfully going it alone either jointly or separately. Secession talk is largely emotional and no serious thought appears to be given to how economic and security problems would be solved. The assumption is made that Commonwealth military and economic aid would be available. Stephens seems to have been jolted by recent advice that he should not count on British aid and others may have been bothered. But these effects are likely to wear off. Apprehension about Indonesia is an important consideration but not necessarily dominant because of the assumptions that are made about continuing Commonwealth assistance while confrontation continues.
9. I agree with your para. 6 but I would add that any early further break-up of Malaysia would give Sukarno and Indonesian revolutionary policies a tremendous boost and would be a major set-back to stability and our interests in this part of the world.
10. A non-Chinese Government could only remain in power in an independent Sarawak if the British were prepared to provide the essential support. This would obviously create serious problems for the British and a left-wing Chinese take-over would be a distinct possibility.
11. Despite the stresses and strains, I believe that at least in the short run Sabah and Sarawak will remain in Malaysia. Both States would probably prefer to be British protectorates, but in the final analysis they will be forced to realise the limits of British involvement and to face the realities of the Indonesian threat.
12. Some Borneo leaders, notably perhaps Stephens and Ong Kee Hui may well look towards Singapore. In some respects, this makes sense. Singapore can provide many of the men and material resources that Borneo needs and the established trade and communication ties (especially of Sarawak) are with Singapore. But a loose arrangement with Singapore would raise major problems and as you know, both Borneo States have long been worried about Chinese immigration.
13. As far as Singapore is concerned, Pritchett finds a very short-sighted attitude that Borneo does not matter. But he believes this open to discussion and considers Singapore could play a constructive role in supporting the value of the Malaysian arrangement. He suggests however that present feeling would be that any comment by Singapore even in support of Kuala Lumpur would arouse great hostility in the Alliance Government.
14. There remains the question of whether there might be a re-appraisal in Kuala Lumpur of the value of Malaysia. There are a number of arguments for re-appraisal:—
(a) With the separation of Singapore, there is no longer the same threat of a Chinese majority.
(b) The association of the Borneo States has created political difficulties, not least because of their refusal to accept the same status as the 11 Malay States of the Federation.5
(c) The Borneo States are an economic drain and need funds from Kuala Lumpur not only for development plans but even to assist in balancing annual budgets.
(d) To this financial drain must be added the cost in men and money of helping to defend the Borneo States against confrontation.
(e) Borneo States have imposed severe and unpopular strains on Malaysian administrative resources.
(f) To many Malaysians, Sabah and Sarawak are the cause of Sukarno’s confrontation.
15. It is therefore not surprising that in Malaya there are considerable numbers of Malays and indeed non-Malays who would say, ‘Why continue to make the effort?’ Their voices and influence will grow if Borneo fails to settle down and especially if there are rising demands in Sabah and Sarawak for concessions or secession. However, there has been no indication that Government leaders are not prepared to continue to accept the financial and security burdens of Malaysia. I believe they are influenced by the following:—
(a) Prestige and personal involvement. There is also a sense of loyalty to Malaysia’s allies and to colleagues in Sarawak and Sabah who have committed themselves to Malaysia.
(b) The realisation that the alternatives to Sabah and Sarawak staying in Malaysia would all lead to great instability and increase the strength of Malaya’s enemies in this part of the world. The prospect would be an Indonesian take-over or, what would be regarded as worse, a left-wing Chinese take-over in the case of Sarawak.
(c) A genuine feeling that the Borneo States and Malaya share common interests (administration, currency, language etc) and problems, and a belief that the Federation can be made to work in the common interest. Ismail would argue, for example, that Malaya has much more in common with the Borneo States than it has with Singapore.
(d) There could be a fear that the disintegration of Malaysia could lead to the end of British military and economic support in the region.
(e) It has also been suggested that Malaysia’s image already tarnished by accusations of racialism by the PAP in Singapore could not afford to lose its other non-Malay territories. But I do not think this important.
16. It is in our interests that the Malaysian Government should remain as determined as it is now to ensure that Malaysia survives, but I hope they can be influenced to be less threatening and more persuasive about it. There is also the need for a different attitude on the part of Sabah and Sarawak and a better understanding of the advantages of Malaysia as well as a genuine effort to develop wider loyalties than the States have shown so far. Unfortunately, the part played by expatriates has not been helpful in this respect.
17. It is in our interests that the Malaysian Government should remain as determined as it is now to ensure that Malaysia survives, but I hope they can be influenced to be less threatening and more persuasive about it. There is also the need for a different attitude on the part of Sabah and Sarawak and a better understanding of the advantages of Malaysia as well as a genuine effort to develop wider loyalties than the States have shown so far. Unfortunately, the part played by expatriates has not been helpful in this respect.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/2/1 part 24]
1 Document 325.
2 That is, the transition to Malay as the official language.
3 Merdeka Day—Malaysia’s National Day—31 August.
4 Tun Datu Mustapha bin Datu Harun, Sabah’s Yang di-Pertua Negara (Head of State). See also footnote 5, Document 322.
5 See Documents 8 and 10, and editorial note, Cobbold Commission.