Canberra, 18 February 1963
125. Secret
Indonesia and Malaya
Your Savingram 5.1
I think we must tell the Tunku in firm and unmistakable terms that we believe Malaya must exercise great restraint in official, or unofficial, comments which could provoke reactions in Indonesia or the Philippines. I fear that both sides are approaching positions which will make reconciliation impossible in the short term.
2. You should tell the Tunku that if Malaya persists in making intemperate statements it endangers the support which the West wishes to give it. I have particularly in mind statements which suggest Malayan support for dissident movements in Indonesia and there is also the further complication of Malayan assistance to former Indonesian rebel leaders.2
3. In pointing out to the Tunku that attitude to Malaysia will be influenced by his willingness to adopt a realistic attitude to Indonesia you might introduce in an objective way the question whether the Malayans are ready to defend themselves without calling on others if there is a brush with Indonesia.
4. We expect the Tunku to endeavour to create an atmosphere which will enable Australia and other friendly countries to help him work for the stability of Malaysia and the area. For this reason I feel we must press the Tunku to end the public exchanges between Malaya and Indonesia before we can hope to begin any constructive initiatives directed at the reconciliation of the two countries. I am sure he will recognise that it is our great goodwill for Malaya and our great respect for him primarily which prompts this approach.
[NAA: A1838, 2498/11 part 1]
1 Document 30.
2 A number of leaders of the failed Permesta-PRRI rebellion (see footnote 7, Document 29) fled to Malaya