London, 25 September 1965
Top Secret
By now you will have had reports on the talks about the consequences of the separation of Singapore from Malaysia which have recently been held between official representatives of the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, the United States and Britain.1 We had earlier agreed that these talks were to be purely exploratory and would not commit any of us—naturally no vital decisions had been made by us in advance of these talks, which we found extremely useful.
2. As you know from our talk on 1 July, we have in the course of our current defence review taken into account that by 1970 we might no longer be able to count on the use of the Singapore base once confrontation had been ended, quite apart from any financial considerations which might also have to be taken into account in the review.2 It was the sudden separation of Singapore from Malaysia which made it necessary for us to start the processes of consultation with you and our other allies on our future military posture in the Far East earlier than we had expected and before the studies in our defence review had been completed. But it remains basic to our thinking that, even when confrontation has been ended Britain should continue to play a role in and make a military contribution to defence in the Far East, on the basis of allied cooperative arrangements.
3. I think it is clear from the talks and from the messages which have already been exchanged that while we all share the same aim, that is the defence of Western interests in the South East Asia region, there is some divergence of view about the means of attaining it. This divergence relates firstly to the expected durability of our tenure in the Singapore base, given the political and economic forces at play and the personalities involved— secondly, to the extent to which the separation of Singapore has affected both the fortitude of Malaysia and Singapore together in resisting Indonesian confrontation and our own ability to assist them—and the implications of this for pursuing possibilities of a negotiated settlement—and thirdly, as to the manner in which, dependent on the end of confrontation and the outcome of our defence review, our forces might be redeployed on a cooperative basis.
4. I do not think I need spell out in detail the intricate considerations on the foregoing points which were fully discussed at the talks, but I feel bound to say that our own assessment of the situation is that time is not on our side, either as regards our tenure in Singapore or the continuation of confrontation. We want to play our part in defence arrangements in the Far East area, and we think it most important to ensure that we are in a position to do this if at any time or for any reason it is no longer possible to carry on the use of the Singapore base. Naturally we have no intention of being forced out of Singapore in a humiliating manner, nor of accepting as a condition of ending confrontation that any of the parts of the former Malaysia should, against their will, be left defenceless.
5. All the questions raised by the separation of Singapore from Malaysia are clearly of the greatest consequence for future Western policy in the area, and equally it is of the utmost importance that between us we should find the right solutions. I am certain that we cannot meet this situation except by way of a continuing process of full consultation, leading to the working out of effective future defence arrangements on a fully cooperative basis.
6. I have now been able to review matters with my colleagues. You and we are of course agreed that the end of Indonesia’s confrontation is in itself a most desirable objective. We do not however have it in mind for the time being to initiate a move towards ending it and we shall need to consult together if and when we think that the time has come to make such a move or to take advantage of any move that might be made by a third party. It was at the recent talks the view of the representatives of the United States, Australia and New Zealand that the position created by the separation of Singapore did not render the situation so immediately insecure as to justify at present a positive initiative by us designed to bring confrontation to an end. However the whole of the position in relation to confrontation seems to us to be highly uncertain, and while we have decided on a policy of ‘wait and see’ for the present, some change in the situation may at any time and at short notice demand the most urgent consultations between us as to the means of dealing with it.
7. As regards defence matters, it will be our aim to have further consultations as soon as possible with the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United States about the Singapore base and our future defence arrangements in the Far East. These consultations will have to be placed in the global context of our defence review and we will be making proposals to you about this as soon as that review is sufficiently advanced.
[NAA: A6706, 61]
The Abortive Coup
By September 1965, Indonesia’s political situation was volatile. The economy had deteriorated to a parlous level, food prices had spiralled, the PKI had increased its power base, and the poor state of Sukarno’s health was causing widespread uncertainty about the succession. On the night of 30 September–1 October 1965, a group of dissident army and air force officers—self-styled the 30th September Movement—attempted a coup against the Indonesian Army leadership. Six senior army generals were killed in the operation. General Nasution was injured but escaped the attack on his life which resulted in the death of his adjutant and daughter. The Army under Major-General Suharto, the commander of KOSTRAD (Strategic Reserve Command), quickly put down the movement and assumed control in Jakarta. The fate of President Sukarno, who ‘disappeared’ on the night of the coup, was not known until 3 October when he made a short recorded statement on Radio Republic Indonesia again assuming control of the country. Although there is no firm evidence that the PKI inspired the coup, they quickly came out in support of it and were soon perceived to be responsible. There was a violent anti-PKI reaction which ran out of control over the following months and led to the massacre of hundreds of thousands of alleged communists and ethnic Chinese.
In the weeks following the attempted coup, President Sukarno made a small number of public appearances but it was apparent that the scope of his authority had been reduced. His attempts to shield the PKI were unsuccessful and his appeals for national unity failed to halt the increasing scale of the attacks on the communists. On 14 October, Sukarno appointed Suharto Minister/Commander of the Army which, over the next five months, established itself as the major political force throughout Indonesia. As the Army’s power was consolidated in the regions, the rift between Sukarno and the Army leadership widened, particularly over his refusal to ban the PKI, but there were no moves to displace him. This would not come until March 1966 when student agitation against continued economic deterioration and escalating inflation served to break the apparent deadlock within the Indonesian leadership.
1 Hicks and McIntyre reported verbally to the FAD Committee of Cabinet on their return from the talks held 3–7 September. On matters affecting Malaysia and Singapore, they said the British view was that there would be no reduction in the level of British forces and activity in the area while confrontation continued; that the UK would not initiate any negotiations to end confrontation without consultation with the US, Australia and New Zealand; and that the UK Government would consider initiatives undertaken by other countries to end the dispute more seriously that it had in the past, without proposing to promote such initiatives.
2 Following the Prime Ministers’ Conference (17–25 June), Wilson had requested private bilateral talks with Menzies to discuss the options being considered in the current British defence review which had been necessitated by a strain on manpower and the need to reduce expenditure by the end of the review period, 1969–70. Wilson’s purpose was to obtain Menzies’ ‘reactions in general discussion before developing his ideas further’. On the matter of the Singapore base, Wilson believed that it was ‘presumably secure so long as confrontation lasted’ but that it ‘could not be depended on for more than a very few years’. He advised that for planning purposes it had been assumed, as a matter of convenience not from ‘any confident assessment’, that the dispute would end by 1970.