Canberra, 1 October 1965
Confidential
Lord Head’s Views on the Situation in Borneo
The British High Commissioner to Malaysia, Lord Head, recently visited Sarawak and Sabah. His views on the situation in those states are summarized below.2
2. Lord Head described the feeling in Borneo as one of ‘all-pervading uncertainty’ about the future. The basic consideration affecting the non-Muslims (who comprise more than three-quarters of the population in both states) was fear of Malay domination, especially following the separation of Singapore and its predominantly non-Malay population from the federation. Broadly speaking, three possible courses of action were being canvassed:—
(a) Secession. The Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), which has a strong pro-communist wing, was already advocating a referendum on this issue, but other politicians, including Donald Stephens in Sabah, were not in favour of outright secession.
(b) Greater state autonomy within a looser federation. This appeared to be favoured by Stephens and his United Pasok-Momogun Kadazan Party (UPKO) and also by some members of other government parties.
(c) ‘Soldiering on’ as at present until at least the end of confrontation. Government members generally supported this policy but Lord Head was uncertain about the extent to which they were supported by their various parties.
3. A particular problem in both States was that State Government leaders were obliged in practice to work with Kuala Lumpur and this left them open to charges of being ‘Malay stooges’. Support for moderate leaders was therefore in danger of erosion by both the SUPP and UPKO, who were in favour of a tougher line with Kuala Lumpur and were playing on fears of a Malay-dominated Malaysia. In Sarawak there was a risk that the Dyak Chief Minister (Ningkan) would at some time in the future decide that it was personally expedient to swim with the anti-Kuala Lumpur tide. In Sabah the principal risk was a more direct collision between Muslims (led by Tun Mustapha, who recently stepped down from the Governorship to resume leadership of the Muslim party USNO) and non-Muslims, led by Stephens, who had begun making overtures to the Sabahan Chinese. While Stephens seemed genuine in not wanting secession, Lord Head felt that if Stephens won the direct elections scheduled for March, 1966, he might be forced to attempt a secessionist move, especially because of his recent advocacy of policies clearly not acceptable to Kuala Lumpur (for example, the introduction of Chinese as a national language).3 Lord Head thought that the elections might be preceded by a bitter campaign in which Stephens and Mustapha would create a high political (and communal) temperature. Attempts by Kuala Lumpur to postpone the elections could likewise create trouble.
4. On the other hand, Lord Head believed that uncertainty about the future was having a sobering effect in many circles. There seemed to be a wide acceptance that independence would render Sarawak and Sabah both defenceless and unable to finance their economic development, whereas at least as long as confrontation lasted the British would probably remain and the Central Government would provide development finance. These thoughts worked in favour of moderation and a feeling that nothing radical should be done until confrontation was over.
5. Lord Head’s conclusion was that neither Sabah nor Sarawak would attempt to secede until elections were held in Sabah, unless in the meantime the Central Government gave serious provocation to those who feared Malay domination. Beyond that he was not prepared to make a forecast except to say that the situation ‘could be held for some time’ if handled skilfully by Kuala Lumpur and if Stephens did not win the elections (or if no elections were held).
Comment
6. In the period immediately following Singapore’s separation from Malaysia, morale in the Borneo States was low, and there was a danger of some precipitate action in the direction of separation. Fortunately no serious moves developed at this time. The Tunku’s visit to the Borneo States,4 which it was hoped would restore morale, had virtually the opposite effect. His high-handedness and lack of understanding of the local scene seriously upset leaders of State parties. Tun Razak subsequently visited the States and tried to repair some of the damage, but it is doubtful whether the anti-Kuala Lumpur feeling generated or strengthened by the Tunku’s visit has been allayed by Razak.
7. We have no recent first-hand report from our own officers against which to compare Lord Head’s assessment.5 However, we would see no reason to think that he is taking an unnecessarily gloomy view of the situation. The next few months will undoubtedly be crucial in Borneo and, while we would think Lord Head is correct in saying that there is a growing awareness of the weakness of Sabah’s and Sarawak’s positions if they do try ‘to go it alone’, the danger persists that movements for separation will become stronger.
8. Head believes that the best solution in Sabah would be for Tun Mustapha’s USNO party to win the State elections. Our thinking is that, if the State elections were fought on issues which at the popular level were seen primarily in communal terms, then UPKO (Stephens’s party) would have a decided advantage because of the size of the respective racial groups, and should win more seats than USNO. Its position would be fairly well assured if it attracted substantial Chinese support away from the moderate Chinese party which is led by Loh, the Chief Minister of Sabah. We would doubt whether USNO could come to power unless electoral boundaries, which have not yet been finally set, were gerrymandered in USNO’s favour and the party could attract and retain the support of some of the Chinese members of the new State Assembly.6
[NAA: A1838, 3028/2/1 part 3]
1 Renouf had been appointed First Assistant Secretary, Division 4, DEA, in July.
2 On 17 September, Critchley had sent a report of Lord Head’s assessment of Sabah’s prospects to DEA who found it ‘a disturbing one’. On 30 September, Critchley was asked to provide information on the effect for Sabah’s future in Malaysia of the possible introduction of Chinese as the national language, on USNO’s electoral chances, and on the delineation of the electoral boundaries and communal population distribution.
3 The Malaysian constitution provided that Malay would be the national language, with the proviso that English could be used for official purposes until 31 August 1967 and thereafter until Parliament otherwise provided. The constitution also provided that there would be complete freedom to teach, learn and use any other language (official purposes excepted), and federal and state governments were empowered ‘to preserve and sustain the use and study’ of any language of the non-Malay community. There were additional safeguards for the use of English and native languages in the Borneo states, and Singapore’s language policy whereby both English and Chinese were used for official purposes had been guaranteed. Since the separation of Singapore, and with the imminence of the use of Malay as the sole official language, this policy had become a difficult political issue and had the potential to exacerbate communal feelings. Agitation against the policy was taking the form of a demand that Chinese be introduced as an official language, with supporters of the policy change citing the example of Singapore which was promoted as the ‘Switzerland of Southeast Asia’.
4 See footnote 2, Document 320.
5 Critchley’s reply on 19 October to DEA’s request of 30 September (see footnote 2) still did not provide first-hand observations as he had been unable to arrange for an officer to visit Sabah until early in November. However, he believed that the situation had improved somewhat with the Central Government becoming ‘far more active and far more sensitive’ about Sabah and Sarawak. Federal ministers had been undertaking regular visits to Sabah, in particular, in an effort to improve the state’s relationship with Kuala Lumpur. The visits were high profile, with the ministers emphasising unity and announcing housing schemes or other new developments. Nonetheless, in the forthcoming elections, Critchley felt that native loyalties would favour Mustapha, a feudal chief, and that an unknown factor in the election would be the vote of the influential Chinese who through lack of effective Chinese leadership would retain their options until closer to the elections. In Critchley’s view Mustapha, Lo (Loh) and the Malaysian ministers were under-estimating Stephens.
6 In the event, the clash between a Stephens-led UPKO and the ustapha-led USNO that threatened to destroy the Sabah Alliance was avoided by Stephens’ resignation from politics on 2 November for health reasons and in order ‘to keep the State Alliance unbroken’. Stephens’ health concerns were credible but his resignation also resulted from USNO calls in mid-October for his impeachment for ‘inciting the public to breaches of internal security’, and from threats to expose his involvement in corrupt dealings in timber leases in Sabah.