Kuala Lumpur, 15 October 1965
1798.
Malaysian Reaction to the Indonesian Crisis
For the first few days after the coup in Djakarta, there was little reaction of consequence from either the Malaysian Government or the press. The Tunku was quoted as saying that the Communists may have overplayed their hand; the Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Inche Senu, as hoping the Indonesians might be able to look forward to the future with some degree of confidence as a result of the developments; and Tun Razak in the most forthright statement (obviously tailored for his audience), {as stating} it would mean that the Indonesians would be too busy to worry about confrontation. Other government leaders expressed hopes for improved relations between Malaysia and Indonesia.
2. As more information became available, the Government began to comment more freely. An article in the 8th October issue of the government weekly, ‘Suara Malaysia’, said that Malaysia’s sympathy went out to the Indonesian people ‘with whom we have no quarrel and with whom we have strong attachments of language and culture’. The paper hoped that the anger of the people at the Communists’ killing of six Generals would have ‘a profound effect’ upon the future of Sukarno’s political disposition.
3. Speaking in Ipoh2 on 9th October, the Tunku expressed hopes that Sukarno would grasp the ‘golden opportunity’ to side with the Army and to oust the Communists for once and for all. He said the Indonesian people had now realized that their real enemies were the Communists and not the West or Malaysia and that it was his fervent prayer that the showdown between the Army and the Communists would bring victory to the Army. According to the ‘Straits times’ (12th October), the Tunku expressed confidence that confrontation would end once the Army took over and ‘cleaned up’ the Communists. However, because the PKI was backed by China a ‘war of liberation’ was possible in Indonesia, but Malaysia would be willing to provide help to quell any Communist insurgence if requested. Following a meeting of the Malaysian Cabinet on the 13th October, the Tunku was less hopeful. He told newsmen that Sukarno was still speaking the language of the Communists and that he was obviously getting backing from China and Russia. He still hoped the Army would grapple with the Communists and build up the country for the benefit of the people. If the Army showed that it wished to do this and that it was no longer interested in confrontation, it should be the ‘duty of the free world to help the Indonesians’.
4. In the course of his recent tour of the Borneo States, the Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Inche Senu, expressed hopes on several occasions that the Indonesian people would take the opportunity to form an anti-Communist Government.3 Commenting on relations between Indonesia and Malaysia, he said that the Indonesian people, despite the cries of their leaders, had never been against Malaysia or its people and that Malaysia would accept [them] with open arms should Indonesia wish to re-establish relations.
5. The Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Razak, probably summed up Malaysian feelings when he told newsmen on the 14th October that he hoped there would emerge in Indonesia a Government, free of Communists and Communist influence, which would have a change of attitude towards Malaysia.
6. The attitude of the press was similar to that of the government. It was generally argued that at least the Communists’ hopes of seizing power had been frustrated, but some papers suggested that Sukarno’s continued efforts to balance the Communists against the Army could lead to civil war. Almost without exception the papers expressed hopes that Indonesia would realize that the welfare of its people was more important than bowing down to the Communists and that the incident would lead to better relations between Malaysia and Indonesia.
7. In sum, Malaysian reactions to the events in Djakarta have been predictable: hopes for the defeat of the Communists and for improved relations between Malaysia and Indonesia.
[NAA: A1838, 3034/2/1/8 part 3]
1 Geoffrey Bentley, Third Secretary, Kuala Lumpur.
2 Capital of Perak state and Malaysia’s third largest city, 200 km north of Kuala Lumpur.
3 See footnote 5, Document 335.