Jakarta, 15 April 1966
415. Confidential
Confrontation
From here, we are finding it difficult to sort out in any consistently logical way the events of the past week insofar as they bear on the policy of the new Indonesian leaders towards Malaysia, confrontation and recognition of Singapore. Our uncertainty has been compounded to the extent that we have deliberately avoided raising these issues with any senior Indonesian.
2. If on Singapore we accept that Malik’s intentions were honourable, perhaps the most puzzling thing is how inexpertly he handled Indonesia’s stated willingness to recognise Singapore. The decision to do this was made at a Cabinet Presidium session last weekend, but it is something which we know Malik had had in mind for some time. In fact he told the Pakistani Ambassador about a week earlier that it was his intention to recognise Singapore soon.
3. Malik claims to have channels to Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. But so far as we can see, he does not seem to have taken any steps to sound out Lee or the Tunku in advance.This is a strange oversight for someone who is as politically experienced and skilled as Malik. Privately, Malik has said that the announcement linking recognition of Singapore with the intensification of confrontation was a sop to Sukarno. He has also argued that this move was part of his plan to seek a genuine rapprochement over confrontation. Why then did he make his announcement in terms which were much more likely to complicate rather than solve the issue?
4. The only suggestions which we have heard which might explain some of these apparent contradictions is one which comes indirectly from two members of Malik’s staff to the effect that events moved too quickly for him. According to these sources Sukarno surprised Malik at the Cabinet Presidium by agreeing so readily that Indonesia should recognise Singapore and Malik was compelled either by Sukarno’s enthusiasm or the fear that the President would have second thoughts to announce the decision immediately. He also felt obliged publicly to link this decision with intensification of confrontation which had been the avowed purpose of the arguments used to convince Sukarno.
5. Whatever the explanation for this stir-up over Singapore it does illustrate the difficulties from the Djakarta end of any sincere attempt at this stage to reach a settlement. The simple fact is that at the moment there does not seem to be any such thing as an ‘Indonesian point of view’. Rather there are a number of different points of view incorporating at least three different elements.
6. First, there is the view of the Malik-led group. As you will know from any sources he has continued to make conciliatory private gestures and to give every indication of being seriously interested in efforts to settle this problem. I think we must accept these gestures as genuine even though at times the terms hinted at (whether there be reascertainment, separation of the Borneo Territories, and so on) are unlikely to be readily acceptable to Kuala Lumpur. But he at least seems willing to make a genuine attempt at a settlement.
7. Secondly, there is the Army. For the present Malik is working closely with Suharto and the Army, and between them seem to have convinced Sukarno that successful military solution to confrontation is impossible. However, overnight, the Army is unlikely to be prepared to forget Nasution’s view or the military planners’ worries about potential military threat to Indonesia of a foreign base in Singapore and foreign troops in Malaysia. For some time yet this will inhibit at least the speed at which many of the Army leaders are prepared to re-adjust their views about confrontation and a foreign military presence in their midst. They will, for instance, be watching carefully to see what flows from Lee’s discussions in London on the Singapore base.1
8. Thirdly, there is the President and while he remains we must accept that he will be a threat to any attempt to settle the dispute peacefully. Confrontation is one of the few pillars of his political edifice which remains intact and until the Army decides that it wants to, or can, get rid of Sukarno altogether, he will still be capable of destroying any new initiatives. For instance, a strong personal attack on the Tunku or on Malaysia’s sincerity about wanting a settlement would probably be enough. There is also the added risk that if Sukarno is given an opportunity to disrupt attempts to settle the dispute, he will be able to divide those who are at present united against him on most other issues. In short, a domestic dispute over confrontation could be the one issue which would allow Sukarno to move back closer to the centre of the stage before age or the gathering political strength of his opponents finally overwhelm him.
9. Expressed another way, this means the time does not yet seem ripe for a settlement and we are likely to be disappointed if we expect, and wrong if we encourage, any attempts to solve the dispute quickly. Sukarno must be crushed first and the less flexible elements in the Army given a chance to re-adjust their thinking to the possibility of a political compromise on Malaysia, and to the proposition that a British military presence in Singapore poses no threat to an Indonesia which genuinely intends to live on good terms with its neighbours.
10. In the meantime, however, there are some other things which could probably still be done. For instance the first stage could be a mutual understanding for the withdrawal of troops from the border areas. As you will know from Gilchrist’s last conversation with Malik, this is something in which Malik has professed a great interest and willingness to discuss with the Army.2 Not only would this give the Army a breathing space to crush Sukarno finally and to change its own thinking, but would also provide the opportunity in which Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur could build up the minimum amount of trust of each other which will be necessary before any serious discussions can be contemplated.
11. While these trends are being given a chance to develop, probably the most constructive thing we can do is to wait quietly and patiently, but watching for opportunities discreetly to nudge developments in the right direction.
[NAA:A9735, 225/5 part 1]
1 Lee was to visit London from 19–26 April for discussions on the renegotiation of the UK’s use of the Singapore base and other defence and economic affairs.
2 Sir Andrew Gilchrist, UK Ambassador to Indonesia. Gilchrist had seen Malik on 25 March to follow up an earlier discussion in which he had put forward the notion of a reciprocal withdrawal of troops from the border areas as a preliminary move which could influence the political situation within Indonesia and improve relations between Malaysia and Indonesia. At this second meeting, when Malik said that ‘a little delay, though harmful, could be tolerated’ in ending confrontation, Gilchrist had again pointed out ‘how serious delay could affect the frontier’ (that is, for the Commonwealth and Indonesian forces who remained opposed there). Malik had then said that he ‘fully grasped the point’ and that he would speak to Suharto that evening.