Kuala Lumpur, 6 May 1966
1165. Secret
Malaysia/Indonesia
We have no further developments to report since yesterday’s telegram No. 11411 and No. 1156.2 It might, however, be of some use if I attempted some summary of the situation as seen here today.
2. It is, of course, impossible to pick one’s way with complete confidence through the continuing welter of conflicting Indonesian statements, both public and private, and through equally conflicting third-party quotations of what various Indonesians are supposed to have said or intended. Some parts of these reports are obvious nonsense and on some points of conflict there seems no profit at this stage in attempting to guess where the truth may lie. There are, however, some points on which it seems possible to reach reasonably firm conclusions.
3. In the first place, I have no difficulty in believing that Malik and the various generals, probably in still differing degrees, genuinely want negotiation, peace and the end of confrontation. So, for that matter, did Sukarno and Subandrio in their fashion and on their own terms. The new regime will, however, have the following additional incentives:
(a) They will be more conscious of the futility and wastefulness of earlier tactics in the pursuit of confrontation.
(b) They have a much livelier awareness of the need to conserve and divert national resources and efforts towards internal reconstruction, not only in order to consolidate their own positions but no doubt also for the good of the nation as a whole.
(c) They will also be aware that the continuance of confrontation by means which international opinion might find it difficult to condone might complicate their efforts to extract massive economic aid, particularly from the United States.
However, at this stage at least, there is no ground for believing, and it would in my view be foolish to expect, that the new regime’s desire for negotiation and for the ending of confrontation has swept them to the point of being willing to throw their whole hand in.
4. The main objectives of confrontation as devised by Sukarno and Subandrio were the elimination of British bases and the detachment of Sabah and Sarawak from Malaysia. There is plenty of evidence going back as far as two years ago that Nasution, at that time the spokesman of the right wing generals, was just as opposed to the presence of British bases as his then political masters,3 although his grounds of objection may have been slightly different and although he was critical in some respects of the way they were pursuing this objective.4 In view, however, of the robust anti-communist posture which the new regime has adopted, both domestically and internationally, I would agree that there should be good prospect that they would now be at least reconciled to the continuance of bases in mainland Malaysia and Singapore, and might even actively welcome them at least until Indonesia felt that the containment of Chinese Communism could be managed adequately without them. I am sure we have not heard the last of the issue of British bases but would agree that they are unlikely to be an immediate bone of contention in any real negotiations with Malaysia.
5. On the other hand, I see no sufficient reason to believe that any of the currently influential figures in Djakarta, however much their individual attitudes may vary in detail, are in any mind to abandon their pressure for the detachment of the Borneo Territories.5 Malik (whose identity of attitude with that of Suharto and the other generals is by no means established) did in one conversation suggest that the Government would be satisfied with a face-saving formula. This beguiling phrase has been familiar to us from the days of West Irian and periodically through the history of confrontation. In the mouths of Sukarno and Subandrio, it proved much less innocent than it sounded. I see no reason to believe or to hope that in the mouths of the new regime it means only a facade behind which they would be ready to throw their whole hand in. I believe that what the new regime would still want would be formula which would provide at least a 50–50 chance, and probably a virtual certainty, of the detachment of both of the states, leaving Indonesia the freedom to extend its ultimate domination over them whether in the framework of Maphilindo Confederation or by some more direct absorption.
6. I see no reason whatever at this stage why the generals should not try to have their cake and eat it and I can foresee at present no sufficient build-up of pressure on them to compel them to limit their appetite. The attitude of the United States, as the largest and overwhelmingly the most important donor, will clearly have an important influence on Indonesian strategy and tactics. In view, however, of the agreeably robust anti-communist stand of the new regime, which must warm the heart of the American Administration and Congress, it is reasonable to assume that, when the leaders can show that they have Sukarno buried and well-tamped down, the United States will be ready to help generously in the economic reconstruction of the country without requiring the abandonment of attempts, by methods not demonstrably military, to detach from Malaysia two scraps of former colonial territory in which the Americans have never had any sympathy or interest. The British, for their part, would not wish to be seen to let Kuala Lumpur down but they are unlikely to do anything to urge Kuala Lumpur to insist on retaining these territories which it costs the British Treasury recurring millions of pounds to defend. We could expect that the British would heave a deep sigh of relief if Kuala Lumpur showed signs of selling the pass, and that they would even be ready to take a few discreet steps towards making it easier for Kuala Lumpur to do so. The Japanese, the Thais and the Filipinos, for their part, are already falling over each other in their attempts to promote a settlement and we could expect that their combined pressure would be directed towards trying to make Malaysia ‘flexible’ on the issue of the Territories.
7. I believe that at this stage the Malaysian leaders would, in varying degrees, be opposed to any abandonment of the Borneo Territories or perhaps even to any formula which might carry a significant risk of their loss. There is some reason to believe that influential non-Malay opinion in the Malaysian Government would be in the forefront of those determined to maintain Malaysia as it is, because of greater prospect that this might give of the emergence of a real multi-racial society. On the other hand, the Malay section of the leadership whose attitude is likely to be decisive, contains some elements who have always regarded Sabah and Sarawak as millstones and would gladly discard them in the interests of a pan-Malay rapprochement. There is another significant section who would just as soon keep the Borneo Territories but would be unwilling to maintain them as the sole obstacle in the way of a settlement. I have no sufficient means at this stage of estimating with confidence the size and influence of these three different factions and I see no early prospect of being able to measure them any better. I feel, however, that one must allow for a real risk that, as the Djakarta regime becomes increasingly respectable internationally and receives an increasing flow of unconditional aid from abroad, the Malaysian Government may find that its already low stocks of international support are draining away and that it will be subjected to increasing pressure, both internationally and domestically to give the Indonesians what they have always wanted.
8. I have drafted the above in deliberately broad and general terms in an attempt to cover the situation as a whole and have therefore not attempted in this message to examine with precision what formulae the Indonesians might propose, what formulae the Malaysians might entertain and what the implications and prospects of each might be. I shall attempt to do this separately in reply to your 796.6
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 39]
1 5 May, reporting Razak’s comments to the press on 4 May that ‘the atmosphere was now conducive for peace talks with Indonesia’. Malaysia welcomed Indonesia’s ‘desire to settle confrontation quickly’ and ‘was prepared to talk and go anywhere for the sake of peace’. There had been no talk of pre-conditions and no direct contact between Malaysia and Indonesia at this stage.
2 5 May, commenting that Razak’s statement to the press ‘seemed to reflect a more optimistic interpretation of the situation’ than had previously been reported. (On 29 April, Parkinson had advised that following his talks with Suharto’s representative in Bangkok, 23–24 April, Ghazali had been ‘gloomy’, particularly given that Indonesia appeared to regard the incorporation of Sabah and Sarawak into Indonesia as a price for ending confrontation.) The ‘change of mood’ was put down to Ghazali’s subsequent talks with Malik in Bangkok the previous weekend—30 April–1 May.
3 For example, in discussing Indonesia’s opposition to foreign bases in the region with Shann on 2 September 1963, Nasution had ‘made it crystal clear that it was Indonesia’s promise to get rid of them’. Nasution believed that the bases did not have the ‘real support’ of the people of the host countries and, therefore, made ‘little contribution to common defence’.
4 See paragraph 6, Document 85; footnote 11, Document 133; and footnote 3, Document 224.
5 See footnote 2.
6 5 May, requesting Kuala Lumpur’s views on the issues involved in the procedures for reascertaining opinion in Sarawak and Sabah as a means of ending confrontation. So that the matter could ‘be further studied’ in Canberra, DEA particularly wanted the High Commission’s ‘judgment’ on ‘the political and psychological impact’ of reascertainment on the two territories; the ‘likely outcome’ of such a process; and the ‘attitudes in Kuala Lumpur’.