Kuala Lumpur, 28 May 1966
1341. Confidential
Malaysia–Indonesia
Ghazali today briefed Wade, Walker and myself on yesterday’s visit of Indonesian officers.1
2. Ghazali said that a goodwill visit from the ‘enemy’ before formal peace talks had even started might seem odd to Western eyes but this was ‘the kampong way’. Chief purpose was to establish openly an atmosphere of sincerity and goodwill in which negotiators would be able from the start to co-operate in working-out a solution instead of watching each other warily. Furthermore, as mission was sent by Suharto and carried personal message from him, its visit served to clarify status of Malik and show that he had full backing of generals. Lastly the special deference offered to the Tunku was intended to heal any sting left from Sukarno’s past rudenesses. Ghazali thought that these gestures were meant even more for the Indonesian kampongs than for the Malay ones. Pictures of Malaysian leaders being vigorously hugged by some of the top brass of KOGAM2 would prepare the Indonesian people in a traditional way for a negotiation which would bring a peaceful and dignified end to confrontation.
3. In reply to a question Ghazali said that no attempt had been made by either side to discuss the content of a settlement or otherwise to talk serious business. They had concentrated on backslapping and photography and at times they had come close to running out of conversation.
4. Wade and Walker expressed some concern at not having been given advance warning of visit and some earlier briefing as to its purpose. Ghazali admitted that, when I saw him midday Thursday, he knew of probability of visit but felt he could not go further than to ‘theorize’ to me. Until 3 a.m. on Friday he did not know with absolute certainty that mission would come and when. If he had told the three of us beforehand, and we had reported the news around as we would, there could have been embarrassment if the mission had misfired. In any case, as the mission was not intended to discuss any serious business, he did not see how the lack of foreknowledge could have embarrassed us or our Governments. His final comment, which he put quite gently, was that although we had kindly been helping Malaysia in the good fight, the fight was theirs and they would like to be left to settle it in their own way.
5. Ghazali refused to be drawn on the detail of possible formulae for the Razak–Malik talks. The atmosphere had been prepared and they were happy to wait and see what grew naturally out of the discussions. Walker mentioned Murray’s3 instructions to talk to Malik about need for cessation of attacks from Indonesian territory and about complexities of disengagement. Ghazali looked rather more displeased but his only comment was that, when Malik had made him an offer of disengagement as a gesture of sincerity, Ghazali had said he did not want it. Let the forces stay where they were. After the peace talks they could shake hands across the border and then join forces to take care of the CCO. (Malik had not reacted to the latter suggestion.) In any case Ghazali did not expect Razak and Malik to try to do more than to find a very general formula. There would undoubtedly need to be further meetings (perhaps even a second one at the same level) to spell things out in greater detail. (There would probably also need to be a number of specialist liaison committees to work out details in particular fields.)
6. As we were leaving Walker said he assumed Britain could go ahead now with supplying Rolls Royce engines for the Garuda Fokkers.4 Ghazali said that that could be considered after Monday. Despite the hugging of visitors yesterday Malaysian Government was not starry-eyed and would want to see results of Razak–Malik meetings before dropping its guard in any way.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7]
1 An eight-member goodwill delegation of Indonesian Armed Forces officers, led by Rear Admiral O. B. Shaaf, Indonesian Navy, had visited Kuala Lumpur on 27 May.
2 See footnote 15, Document 354.
3 James Murray, UK Counsellor and Consul-General in Jakarta.
4 The UK had placed an embargo on the export of strategic stores and material at the end of 1963.