Singapore, 1 June 1966
685. Confidential
Malaysia/Singapore/Britain: Defence Agreements
Your 835.1
I spoke briefly yesterday to Bogaars and Goh Keng Swee about defence arrangements with Malaysia and Britain.
2. Bogaars said that at the last meeting of officials Ghazali had agreed ‘as a last minute concession’ that he would table headings of a Defence Agreement and Singapore may table headings of an Economic Agreement. The next meeting was set for June 9, but was now uncertain because of the Indonesian talks. It seemed unlikely that the Malaysians would be forth-coming on economic matters (they had persistently resisted a proposal by Lim Kim San last December for discussion of collaboration in industrial development) and therefore no progress could be expected on the defence side.
3. Goh agreed with me that the defence counter in dealing with Malaysia was now weaker than ever, and he too saw no prospect of agreement on either defence or economic matters. I suggested that it might be worthwhile having a Defence Agreement with the Malaysians in order to get on with the British. But he said there was little point in this: if the British decided to go they would not be held back by any agreement. (Neither Bogaars nor Goh accept that a Defence Agreement with Malaysia might be desirable for its own sake and see Malaysia’s interests only in terms of getting a grip on Singapore.)
4. I reminded Goh that I had urged the danger of a British withdrawal to him last August and said this was still something Singapore should be working hard to prevent or at least delay. Goh said he did not take pressure inside the British Labour Party for immediate withdrawal too seriously and thought the British would still be here for another five or seven years. He wondered how much notice there would eventually be of withdrawal. Goh’s comments were pretty speculative and his attitude as usual, fatalistic. Perhaps Lee will be better informed. Goh thought Malaysians like the Tunku, Razak and Ismail would not want to be swallowed up by the Indonesians and would want the British to stay.
5. Goh spoke of the danger of fragmentation in Indonesia and agreed he had now changed his views on this.
6. Goh asked about the Australian position after a British withdrawal. I said I doubted our thinking had ventured far into this uncharted region. Goh touched on the possibility of our remaining in the Singapore base. His mind seems to be turning in a vague, preliminary way to new associations, for example with Thailand and certainly with ourselves.
[NAA: A1209, 1966/7358]
1 27 May, requesting Singapore’s views on the uncertainty surrounding a Singapore–Malaysia defence agreement. The uncertainty arose from Malaysia’s disagreement with Singapore’s insistence on a concurrent economic agreement and was compounded by the UK’s position that a UK–Singapore defence agreement could only be considered after a Singapore-Malaysia agreement had been concluded.