Canberra, 20 February 1963
590. Secret Priority
Malaysia and Indonesia
Your 802.1
We agree that there is a pressing need for greater diplomatic effort by the British to ensure peaceful acceptance of Malaysia. The Brunei revolt 10 weeks ago demonstrated clearly the need for constitutional reform in Brunei (our 4584 of 21st December)2 but nothing s of ar has been achieved. Nor would it appear that reforms are imminent. No effort is being made to register a more convincing popular expression of support for Malaysia in Sarawak and North Borneo. British reactions to Indonesian opposition to Malaysia appear to be largely in military terms. Efforts to counter Philippines objections (Thomas’3 visit to Manila—primarily for the E.C.A.F.E.4 Conference) appear quite inadequate.
2. We still believe that the first objective is to convince the British of the need to demonstrate greater popular support for Malaysia in the three Borneo Territories. Expressions of support from legislative bodies which are not fully elective are unlikely to pass scrutiny by the Committee of 24. You should thus pursue further, the proposal in paragraph 1(c) of our 558.5 We envisage a joint body something akin to a Constitutional Assembly meeting preferably before the separate state legislative councils consider the Lansdowne Report6 and consisting not only of members of the Councils of the three territories but also of representatives from a wide cross-section of functional, racial and other social groups. In addition to demonstrating wider popular support for Malaysia a body of this kind would have the added advantage of providing tangible proof of the unity and pro-Malaysia attitude of the three territories in the face of foreign threats.
3. The creation of this body would not, of course, absolve the continuing and urgent need for constitutional reforms in Brunei designed to pave the way ultimately for a more democratic expression of opinion. We do not share the British view (your paragraph 6)7 that ‘democratic processes’ in Brunei can safely be left to evolve after Malaysia.
4. Meanwhile, we would hope that Britain would continue to consult separately, continuously and at a senior level with Indonesia and the Philippines (your paragraph 6)8. In these consultations serious account should be taken of Indonesian and Philippines political reservations about Malaysia and some attempt made to meet them. Attempts to steamroller Malaysia through according to the present timetable without making an effort to mollify the Philippines and Indonesia will almost certainly result in deep-seated antagonisms towards the new Federation which may well be beyond the capacity of both Britain and Malaya effectively to counter.
5. Please take an early opportunity to reiterate these points to British officials. In doing so, you might also mention that Thanat has urged on Booker9 the need for registering greater popular support for Malaysia in the Borneo Territories.
6. Since there seems little doubt that Azahari is the only popular leader of any substance in Brunei, we should also be interested to have British views as to whether Azahari might yet be won over by financial or other inducements.
7. You might also ask British officials what combined or individual British/Malayan diplomatic efforts, if any, are being made to popularise Malaysia with the Afro-Asian group—especially Muslim members.
8. For Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.10 We should be glad of your views on the suggestion in paragraph 2 above. We should also appreciate your views on any other devices you may be able to suggest in order rapidly to demonstrate greater popular support for Malaysia in the Borneo Territories and to achieve constitutional reform in Brunei.
[NAA: A1838, 2498/11 part 1]
1 See footnote 5, Document 35. Eastman had also reported that the British were undecided on ways of gaining some show of popular support for Brunei’s entry into the proposed federation and ‘saw no attractions’ in Canberra’s proposal for a joint meeting of the leaders of the three territories.
2 It concerned the difficulties emerging between the Philippines and Malaya over the proposed federation. Barwick had instructed Eastman to suggest a number of steps to the Foreign Office that might assist in improving the situation, including ‘some indication to the Philippine Government that the British will urge on the Sultan of Brunei the necessity for immediate constitutional reforms’. See also editorial note, Brunei Revolt.
3 Peter Thomas, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office. Eastman had reported that Thomas would be following up the recent Anglo-Philippine discussions while in Manila for the conference in March.
4 Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.
5 See footnote 5, Document 35. For paragraph 1 (c), see 1(c) Document 34.
6 See footnote 3, Document 8, and Document 10. The Report was published on 27 February and considered and approved by the North Borneo Legislative Council and Sarawak Council Negri during March.
7 Actually paragraph 4. Eastman had reported that Peck had said that ‘some officials were thinking in terms of basing entry solely on Sultan’s decision, leaving any democratic processes to work themselves out later within federation’.
8 See footnote 5, Document 35.
9 Malcolm Booker, Ambassador to Thailand. Booker had made a call on Thanat on 19 February, during which ‘the question came up of Philippines/Malaya friction’. On the matter of registering popular support for Malaysia in the territories, Thanat did not think it would be ‘difficult to arrange and would cut the ground from under the feet of those who accused the Tunku of “Colonialism”’.
10 This cablegram was also addressed to Singapore 136, Kuala Lumpur 135, and repeated to Jakarta SAV.22.