Kuala Lumpur, 7 July 1966
1679. Secret
End of Confrontation
During Mr Fraser’s call,1 Razak told us that at meeting earlier today he had told Mr Denis Healey2 of Malaysian desire for Malaysian Divisional Commander (Brigadier Ibrahim promoted)3 to take over Borneo Operation Command from DOBOPS4 immediately on signature of settlement with Indonesia and for withdrawal of Commonwealth forces and replacement by Malaysian units to commence as soon as possible thereafter. Healey had raised no objection on either point. Razak had said that he would appreciate Commonwealth assistance in sea and air transport and general logistic field to facilitate changeover. Healey promised to look into this.
2. I referred Razak to point (c) of Malaysian paper (my 1651 and your 1141)5 and asked for some indication of measure and nature of Commonwealth assistance which might be required on Malaysian/Thai border. Razak said there was one Malaysian battalion in Alor Star, another in Taiping6 and half a battalion in Khota Bahru.7 Latter would probably be kept in present location for political reasons but other two units would need to be moved to Borneo to replace Commonwealth forces withdrawn there. Portions of these two units had been used from time to time for anti-terrorist operations on Malaysian side of Thai border and he would be grateful if this role could be taken over as and when necessary by Commonwealth forces. It was unlikely that more than a company or so would be required to operate at any one time and the occasions might not be very frequent. Commonwealth help in air supply of forces operating in that area would also be welcome.
3. Razak had said that estimated force requirement in Borneo after end of confrontation was a minimum of six major units and two minor ones and present plan was to have this number of Malaysian units in position by about January, though it was possible the programme would have to slip until about March and this would not matter very much. I said that I noted that present forces in Borneo included eleven major units of which three were Malaysian and eight were Commonwealth. What was Razak’s timetable for withdrawal of the five ‘surplus’ Commonwealth units? Razak said he had no rigid timetable in mind and matters of logistics would have to be taken into account: the important thing was that the withdrawal should commence very soon after formal agreement with the Indonesians.
4. In reply to a question, Razak said it was not his intention to press on Indonesians any detailed plans for disengagements and withdrawals to be related either generally or stageby-stage to the planned withdrawals on the Malaysian side. It was not practicable to do business with the Indonesians on that sort of basis. Once he could show to the Indonesians that Malaysia was in full command of all forces in Sabah and Sarawak and would in future be dealing directly with them on Borneo problems, the question of Indonesian deployment and activities on their side of the border could where necessary be discussed progressively between border liaison teams and/or the liaison mission in the two capitals.
5. Razak was asked what degree of trust he placed in Indonesian good faith and whether his proposals for withdrawal of all Commonwealth units and halving of force strengths in eastern Malaysia did not expose Malaysia to substantial risks if Indonesians proved to be insincere: in particular it was suggested to him that, once British forces were withdrawn from Borneo, it might be extremely difficult to persuade London to send them back if the situation turned sour. Razak said he did not trust the Indonesians in any absolute sense: he knew that there were some elements in Indonesia which would still like to make trouble in Borneo but he did believe in the good faith of the Triumvirate8 and he did hope that they would be able to maintain and consolidate their control: in any case, even if Indonesians wanted to play false, their many domestic preoccupations would limit the amount of mischief they could make: Razak recognized nonetheless that even a small hostile band infiltrated into Borneo could tie down a totally disproportionate number of security forces. Razak said he was by no means starry-eyed or certain of what the future would bring, but he felt that the only practical way of handling the situation was to deal with the Indonesians on an assumption of good faith and to try to work towards a broadening pattern of co-operation through day-to-day personal contacts. This involved taking some risks but he felt that these risks were justifiable in the wider interests of working towards co-operation between the two countries. If his hopes proved to be ill-founded Malaysia would have to cope with any deterioration to the best of its capacity and with whatever help its friends might be able to give it. Razak added that he had asked both the Japanese and Americans to with-hold any economic aid to Indonesia until the confrontation settlement was signed, [and] he hoped that Australia would be prepared to adopt the same attitude.
6. Razak was asked whether, assuming an end of confrontation and a satisfactory development of relations with Indonesia, he envisaged eventual defence co-operation between the two countries against the communist threat. Razak replied that, so far as the terrorists in the Borneo border areas were concerned, he was still hopeful of working out some degree of joint action with the Indonesians. So far as wider defence was concerned, he believed that regional co-operation on the pattern of A.S.A. should concentrate overtly on economic, cultural, etc. matters and should not deal expressly with contentious political issues or formal defence alliances. If, however, co-operation was developed organizationally in these non-defence fields, and if two or more countries were concerned to protect themselves against a communist threat, de facto co-operation in the defence field could be hoped for if and when the need arose.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7]
1 Malcolm Fraser, Minister for the Army.
2 Healey held talks with Malaysian and Singapore ministers in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore on 7–8 July.
3 Brigadier Ismail bin Ibrahim.
4 The UK Director of Borneo Operations since March 1965 was Major General George Lea.
5 The Malaysian paper was on the end of confrontation and covered the redeployment of Malaysian Armed Forces and the phased withdrawals of Commonwealth forces from East Malaysia and Indonesian forces from the Kalimantan border. Paragraph (c) stated that ‘Commonwealth assistance will be required for operations along the Malaysian/Thai border’.
6 Northwest coast of Malaya.
7 Northeast coast of Malaya.
8 That is, Suharto–Malik–Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX.