Canberra, 21 February 1963
Secret Personal
Yesterday we had a telegram from you saying in effect ‘Is Malaysia sacred?’2 I ask myself this question about once a day because whichever way you look at it, there are difficulties. However, I suppose the question should really be ‘Is our forward position in South East Asia sacred?’ Could we hope to divorce ourselves from Malaysia and nevertheless maintain that? The problem is that we cannot look only at Malaysia; our strategic reserve and in fact our whole defence policy is involved. All our strategy, as you know, is based on our forward position in South East Asia and we would be cutting our own throats if we were to pull out of Malaya.
What seems to me to be a strong reason for us to stay in Malaya is the likely effect on South East Asian countries if we were to leave. For example, the Thais would probably feel that we were contemplating leaving Thailand too3 and this could turn them towards a policy of neutrality which is something we must try to avoid. The Indians, who are at the moment asking us for an air mission to help protect them against the possibility of Chinese bombing, would not be favourably impressed if we were to move our Strategic Reserve from Malaya. Even the Burmese and the Cambodians in spite of their policies of neutrality and their publicly expressed disapproval of Western bases in South East Asia, do privately derive some sense of security from our forces in Malaya and would not be pleased to see them leave.
Perhaps even more important than this is the effect which our removal from Malaya would have on our relations with the United States. At the present time our defence effort is coming under heavy fire of criticism from the Americans4 and we would not endear ourselves to them if we were to withdraw our forces from the Malaysian area. I really feel that because of this we must move very cautiously or we may find ourselves left out of American defence planning.
I know how worrying this whole matter is for you and how careful we must be not to damage our relations with the Indonesians. However, as we have so many interests involved it does seem to me that we must continue with our support for Malaysia.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 5]
1 (John) Keith Waller, First Assistant Secretary, Division I, DBA.
2 Shann had put the view: ‘Our decision whether to press on with or to back away from Malaysia should depend on our assessment whether Malaysia does rest on shaky foundations. To suggest that we should press on with Malaysia come what may because the British are leaving Singapore, is to put the cart before the horse. If Malaysia fails, we will not have solved either the Singapore or British Borneo problems and we may have got ourselves into a very awkward relationship with Indonesia’.
3 A RAAF Sabre jet fighter squadron had been committed to serve at Ubon in Thailand in May 1962 as part of Australia’s SEATO commitments.
4 See paragraph 8, Document 26. US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had also questioned Tange closely on Australia’s preparedness to assume more responsibility for defence in the region in a meeting between the two on 11 February, while Tange was in Washington for the quadripartite talks on Indonesia. Tange reported that he found Rusk’s questioning ‘serious and emphatic’ and that it was ‘quite clear that he [Rusk] was not seeking information but conveying an opinion’.