Manila, 7 March 1963
153. Confidential
Malaysia
After I had discussed arrangements for Minister’s visit with Foreign Under–Secretary Lopez (my telegram 152)2 he said that he supposed that the Minister’s decision to come to Manila at this time was influenced by the fact that there was so much going on here between those concerned with Malaysia which would give him a good opportunity to ‘get the feel of things’. I said that although the Minister was coming in E.C.A.F.E. context, I presumed that he would want to talk about Malaysia, as we were vitally interested in this area. I said that while we appreciated that the Philippines had legitimate security interests, we believed it would be contrary to these interests to pursue a policy which might weaken Malaya, a staunch friend of us both against the Communist danger. We still believed that Malaysia offered the most practical solution to the problem posed by liquidating British colonialism and the need to maintain Singapore as a S.E.A.T.O. base.
2. Lopez then gave me what has become a fairly standard exposition of the Philippines position. They were not so much interested in acquiring North Borneo as in the security of the whole area. They were not convinced that Malaysia would be stable, or that it would strengthen the present federation. What they were looking for was a solution which gave satisfaction to Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines and they still hoped there could be tripartite discussion. He then said with some emotion that for the Filipinos it was largely a matter of pride. They had historical association with North Borneo which Malaya did not and they were military allies of the British. Why then should the British, having decided to liquidate their remaining colonial interests in the area, hand them all over to Malaya and ignore the Philippines? I offered no comment on this, but expressed the hope that they would be able to have useful talks with Thomas and with Razak.
3. I mentioned a recent local press report that forthcoming talks with Subandrio might result in a ‘joint manifesto’ on Malaysia, and asked Lopez whether there was anything in this. He said immediately that there was not. The most the Philippines would subscribe to would be an endorsement of the principles of the United Nations or of the Bandung Conference.3 The Indonesians might of course be seeking something more far–reaching. I said that, if anything like this should be in the wind I hoped they would be able to take us into their confidence as S.E.A.T.O. allies. Lopez replied with apparent sincerity ‘of course’.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 5]
1 Trevett Cutts, Ambassador to the Philippines.
2 Not published.
3 A meeting of 29 African and Asian nations held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, in an attempt to establish an identity as a group opposed to colonialism. The aim was to promote economic and cultural cooperation between developing nations ‘on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty’.