Manila, 15 March 1963
199. Secret
You will now have seen my message to the Tunku. I regret any inconvenience which may have been caused by my decision that you should get back to Kuala Lumpur as soon as possible.1 While there would, no doubt, have been considerable value in a further visit to Djakarta and another discussion with Sukarno I am sure that the most important place for operations in the immediate future, on the plan to get Malaysia into being on time, is in Kuala Lumpur itself.
2. The primary purpose of my efforts here in Manila has been to secure from both Macapagal and Subandrio an undertaking that, given certain reactions from the Malayans, they would not seek to delay, amend, or torpedo the idea of Malaysia. I have made it crystal clear that Australia is for Malaysia and will have no part in schemes for breaking it up, even if this may have, for us, military implications.
3. I am well aware of the dangers of discussing matters between three countries before 30th August. On balance, however, I am convinced that, given understandings I have received (and Canberra will be sending you a record of my conversations), there is more to be said for such discussions, in an endeavour to take the heat out of a deteriorating situation, than against them. Without them I fear very much that Malaysia will be bom in the face of strong and mischievous Indonesian hostility, given an air of respectability by Filipino support.
4. There are risks in this policy. I am putting perhaps more store by Subandrio’s clear statement that I can assume that, given certain Malayan undertakings, he can live with Malaysia in time,2 than I should. I do, however, have more certainty that we will not have undue trouble from Filipinos. But Subandrio has said this publicly now for the first time and has asked only for ‘clarifications’.
5. There is no need for me to repeat what it is that I think the Tunku should do. That is set out in my message to him. I hope the Malayans can give an exposition, not for negotiating Malaysia, but by way of compatibility of the while3 basis of the Malaysia concept. This should not be apologetic in any way, but none the less forthcoming. Your purpose should be to persuade him along these lines, appealing to his sense of statesmanship, and telling him that, while we are strongly for Malaysia and against the preposterous behaviour of the Indonesians in some ways, their existence is one of the facts of life, and that stability in the area and wellbeing of Malaysia may be well nigh impossible with their determination to overt and covert hostilities. You should also say that, in our view, some of his words and actions have given Indonesia perfectly good course4 for suspicion.
6. We are certainly on his side and that of Malaysia but he should not be in any doubt as to whose soldiers will be most deeply committed if we can not achieve the peaceful birth of Malaysia. I know quite well that he will find a Ministerial Meeting with Subandrio personally distasteful, but impress on him that in our view the issue transcends this. Is it possible that he could, at any rate temporarily, appoint another Minister for Foreign Affairs for this purpose, or a Special Minister for negotiations on this matter?5 Perhaps he could say that his own participation should be reserved for a meeting with Sukarno.
7. I have in mind possibly that you and I, and possibly Shann should meet in Singapore or Djakarta, while I am on my way to Paris for S.E.A.T.O.;6 I am also going to call in, if possible, at Djakarta for a day or so if it is on the way to or on the way back. For the time being we have done what we can in Manila and Djakarta. It seems to me that we have had some real success and that Australia can play a most substantial part in getting over these difficulties. Basically the ball turned in Kuala Lumpur’s court.
[NAA: A1838, 2498/11 part 1]
1 Sukarno had specifically asked that Critchley return to Kuala Lumpur via Jakarta (see Document 44).
2 See Document 56.
3 Presumably, ‘whole’.
4 Presumably, ‘cause’.
5 Tunku Abdul Rahman was also the Malayan Minister for External Affairs. Razak was subsequently Malaya/Malaysia’s representative at all ministerial level talks on issues arising out of Indonesia’s confrontation campaign..
6 The Eighth Meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers meeting was due to be held in Paris, 8–10 April 1963.