Kuala Lumpur, 16 March 1963
192. Secret
Tunku told me this morning (March 16th) that he appreciated directness of Minister’s recent message1 and that it was based on desire to help. He would ‘try to comply’ with it. In this spirit he had accepted Subandrio’s two conditions for peaceful settlement of differences over Malaysia and2 they had appeared in press.3 He could do no more until he had received written clarification from Subandrio.
2. Indonesians claimed they wanted to improve atmosphere but only yesterday official spokesman (Harsono) had made another hostile statement against Malayan Government. Tunku said he would ignore this provocation and try to avoid public recriminations.
3. Tunku is not disposed to give up Indonesian broadcasts which he claims are factual (not propaganda) and useful. However, he accepts principle of non-intervention and realises that Sumatra is vital to Indonesia. He also implied agreement that ex rebels like Sumitro and Des Alwi should not be used politically against Indonesia and assured me that Des Alwi is not broadcasting.4
4. Tunku has reservations about proposed meeting with Philippines and Indonesia before Malaysia and [agrees]5 ‘summit’ meeting would present special difficulties. He has given Thomas, who left for Manila yesterday, two messages for Macapagal. Firstly, Federation will entertain Philippines claim to North Borneo after Malaysia. Secondly, Federation is prepared to discuss at official level agenda for Ministerial talks provided Malaysia is no included as subject for discussion. Thomas has also been given authority to speak generally about Malaysia on behalf of Tunku. Razak will be made Minister for External Affairs so that he can represent Federation at Ministerial conference. The Tunku will take over the Defence portfolio which will eventually go to Sulejman6 when he returns from Australia.
5. Tunku was critical of Filipinos who were ‘only concerned with publicity’. Even Indonesians were easier to deal with. Nevertheless Razak’s visit to Manila had been useful and he had not given up hope of influencing them. He would attend A.S.A. Ministerial meeting in Manila in early April but Philippines had done nothing to prepare for it.
6. I reported at some length on my talks with Sukarno and Subandrio. Tunku was appreciative. His main comment was that Sukarno was right in regarding Malaysia as an anti-communist move and he could not deny it. He had only accepted increased responsibilities and difficulties of Malaysia to combat communism. I suggested argument would be better received in Indonesia if it were expressed as problem of assimilating Chinese but Tunku insisted he could not do this as Indonesians would be bound to use it against him. He suggested that I should develop the argument about Chinese assimilation with Djatikasumo when he takes up his appointment as Ambassador to Malaya.
7. Tunku asked me whether Indonesians had given any indication of realising that they were responsible for present difficulties with Malaya. When I told him they had not Tunku went on to explain that Malayans like Ibrahim Yaacob and Iskandar Kamil7 who had taken Indonesian citizenship had been developing organisations to subvert Malaya and bring it under Indonesia. Malayan volunteers for the liberation of West Irian had also been specially trained for this purpose. Some after returning to Malaya, had confessed what they were under instructions to do. The Malayan Government had arranged for them to continue as agents so that it could be kept informed of Indonesian policies and activities.
8. Tunku spoke happily about failure of Indonesia’s efforts to turn Malayans against Alliance Government. He claimed strong anti-Indonesian feeling was developing throughout Malay Kampongs and even was affecting Indonesian groups. As consequence confrontation policy was having beneficial effect of helping to create Malayan patriotic spirit.
[NAA: A1838, 2498/11 part 1]
1 See Document 51.
2 Possibly, ‘as’.
3 At a press conference in Manila, 13 March, Subandrio had stated that the assurances acceptable to Indonesia to eliminate its objections to Malaysia were proof that Malaysia was ‘not hostile to Indonesia’ and that Malaysia would ‘not be used to subvert Indonesia’.
4 See footnote 3, Document 44.
5 Text corrupted in original.
6 That is, Dato Suleiman.
7 Prominent anti-British members of a radical Malay nationalist movement which sought independence for Malaya through union with Indonesia.